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RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
In IFRS (International Financial Accounting Standards) and U.S. GAAP (U.S. Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles), leases are accounted for as either operating leases or finance leases leading
to distinct and materially different effects on financial statements depending on the classification.
Some of these effects are related to performance variables such as earnings or operating profit used
widely in management compensation contracts. This study examines the relationship between
operating lease intensities and levels of management compensation; whether higher relative levels
of CEO bonuses have explanatory power over operating lease intensities implying that operating
leases may have been historically used in order to maximize management compensation. Literature
is reviewed regarding the topics of leasing and management compensation based on which a
hypothesis is formed.
DATA AND METHODOLOGY
A sample of U.S. airlines through years 2008-2018 is examined and an empirical model based on
prior literature on determinants of operating leases constructed to test the hypothesis. Data is
obtained from Compustat and ExecuComp databases resulting in a sample consisting of 155
observations. The analysis is performed using two OLS linear regression models incorporating
different proxies for bonuses: one capturing the ratio of bonuses over total compensation while the
other (a dummy variable) taking on a value of 1 if bonuses are paid. Significant theoretical
determinants of leases are controlled for.
FINDINGS
The study fails to find evidence supporting the hypothesis and instead finds that the level of CEO
bonuses is negatively associated with operating-lease intensity within the sample. This finding is
consistent with more recent research on the topic. Plausible explanations for this negative
association within literature are presently scarce; only some speculation exists.
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Tiivistelmä
TUTKIMUSTAVOITTEET
Kansainvälisissä tilinpäätösstandardeissa (IFRS) ja Yhdysvaltojen tilinpäätösnormistossa (U.S.
GAAP) vuokravastuu raportoidaan joko käyttöleasingina tai rahoitusleasingina. Ennen vuotta 2019
vuokravastuiden kirjanpitokäsittelyn luokittelulla oli olennaisia vaikutuksia tilinpäätökseen ja sen
eriin. Osa näistä vaikutuksista koskee niitä tilinpäätöksen eriä, joita käytetään yleisesti johdon
palkitsemissopimuksissa suorituksen mittareina, kuten nettotulosta ja operatiivista tulosta. Tämä
tutkimus tarkastelee yhteyttä Yhdysvaltalaisten lentoyhtiöiden käyttöleasingintensiteettien ja
johdon palkitsemisen välillä; selittävätkö korkeat johdon bonukset lentoyhtiöiden
käyttöleasingintensiteettejä viitaten mahdolliseen käyttöleasingien opportunistiseen käyttöön,
jonka tavoitteena on bonuksien maksimointi? Kirjallisuuskatsauksessa käsitellään leasingien ja
johdon kompensaation tutkimusta, jonka pohjalta tutkimushypoteesi muodostetaan.
DATA JA TUTKIMUSMENETELMÄ
Tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan Yhdysvaltalaisia lentoyhtiöitä vuosina 2008-2018 ja hypoteesia
testataan kirjallisuuskatsaukseen ja aikaisempaan tutkimukseen perustuvalla empiirisellä mallilla.
Data tutkimusta varten ladattiin Compustat- ja ExecuComp-tietokannoista ja yhdistettynä ne
muodostavat 155 havainnon otoksen. Analyysi suoritettiin kahdella PNS-mallilla (lineaarisella
regressiolla), jotka eroavat toisistaan bonus-muuttujassa: ensimmäisessä mallissa bonus-muuttuja
mittaa bonuksen suhdetta kokonaispalkkioon ja toisessa mallissa bonus on ns. dummy-muuttuja,
joka saa arvon 1, kun bonuksia on maksettu. Malli on kontrolloitu merkittävien leasingia selittävien
teoreettisten tekijöiden osalta.
TULOKSET
Tutkimustulosten perusteella hypoteesi hylättiin ja tulokset viittaavat päinvastaiseen yhteyteen:
bonusten suhteellinen osuus kokonaispalkkiosta on negatiivisessa yhteydessä lentoyhtiöiden
käyttöleasingintensiteetteihin. Tulokset ovat linjassa viimeisimpien samankaltaisia yhteyksiä
tarkastelevien tutkimuksien kanssa. Kirjallisuudessa on niukasti selityksiä tällaiselle negatiivisella
yhteydellä ja tarjolla on vain spekulaatiota.
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11. Introduction
1.1 Brief history of lease accounting
In the U.S., leasing as a form of financing was relatively limited before the end of the 1950’s,
after which it steadily grew into an instrumental alternative to debt. The U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) estimates that in 2015, U.S. companies had approximately 2
trillion dollars’ worth of operating lease commitments (SEC, 2005). With this rise, leasing
became a burning issue in accounting and has been extensively debated ever since (Troberg,
2013). Premises of the debate surrounding lease accounting concern fundamentals: for users of
financial statements, information obtained must be relevant and reliable. Therefore, the
underlying accounting rules must be up-to-date and reflect a true picture of companies’ leasing
activities. Time has shown that, in lease accounting, a consensus on how this can be achieved
has been hard to reach. Indeed, Imhoff et al. (1997) speculate that the longest-running
controversy concerning accounting standards falling short of representing underlying economic
substance may lie in the area of operating leases. It is thus unsurprising then that lease
accounting has been a topic of debate for decades among regulatory bodies, users and issuers
of financial statements.
The most fundamental issue at debate has been about the extent to which leases should be
recorded as assets and liabilities in the balance sheet and expensed as depreciation and interest
expense rather than fully within the group of operating expenses. Leases accounted for in this
manner are called finance leases (or capital leases). The justification for presenting leases this
way lies in the transfer of substantial risks and rewards related to the asset from the lessor to
the lessee making the situation directly comparable to owning the asset outright. In these cases,
the accounting treatment is made to resemble that of purchasing the underlying asset with debt
financing; the lessee records the asset in the balance sheet along with a corresponding liability.
In the income statement, instead of recording a rental expense, the asset is depreciated and
interest expense recorded as per the effective interest rate method. Operating leases on the other
hand are defined negatively: all other leases save finance leases are defined as operating leases
for which no balance sheet items are recorded. Thus, the popularity of operating leases can be,
in part, explained by enabling management to keep financial obligations off the balance sheet
(i.e. off-balance sheet financing). Duke et al. (2009) claim that firms engage in aggressive
2accounting of operating leases in order to keep significant liabilities and assets off their balance
sheet. Imhoff et al. (1991) find that while accounting textbooks describe operating leases as
short-term rental agreements, many companies report non-cancellable operating lease
commitments that are beyond short-term in nature. Goodacre (2003) finds that the average
𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒
𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡
 -ratio (the long-term element of operating lease commitment over on-balance
sheet long-term debt) is 3.3 for retailers in the UK implying that operating leases are materially
important and often even more important than long-term debt. The same study finds that
operating leases in the retail sector are on average 37 times the level of finance leases.
Before 1976, companies in the U.S. had significant discretion over whether to record leases as
operating leases or finance leases. The first big shift came the same year along with The
Financial Accounting Standards Board’s (FASB) Statement of Financial Accounting Standards
No. 13 (SFAS 13) which curbed much of this flexibility and required a much larger portion of
leases to be capitalized (i.e. reported as finance leases). Arguments from proponents and
opponents of lease capitalization concerned issues such as off-balance sheet financing, whether
or not capitalization of leases adequately reflects the underlying flexibility inherent in leases,
effects on debt covenants and so on. Although both SFAS 13 and the comparable IASB’s
(International Accounting Standards Board) IAS 17 standard (International Accounting
Standard 17, which took effect the 1st of January 1984) required a larger portion of leases to be
classified as financial leases, both standards nevertheless left room for discretion and the
possibility of structuring lease contracts in order to achieve the desired accounting treatment
(Duke et al., 2009). FASB together with IASB, in their discussion paper Leases: preliminary
views (2009) note that both IAS 17 and SFAS 13 have been criticized for not meeting the needs
of financial statement users. The discussion paper claims that many find the standards to give
rise to assets and liabilities which remain off balance sheets even when unwarranted by their
economic nature. Such amounts, disclosed but not accounted for by any generally accepted
method, are often adjusted (capitalized) by users to reflect the effects of lease contracts on
income statements (profit/loss) and balance sheets. The problem is, however, that notes
accompanying operating lease disclosures are often seen to be an insufficient basis for reliable
adjustments. According to the paper, users of financial statements also claim that the existence
of two accounting models for leases hampers comparability of financial statements due to the
possibility of similar transactions being recorded asymmetrically as well as allowing the
3structuring of lease contracts to achieve desired classifications. The discussion paper also notes
that preparers of financial statements and auditors have criticized the standard for being too
complex and not being able to distinguish clearly enough between finance and operating leases.
Based on these discussions, FASB and IASB recently took another step towards enhancing the
quality of both lease accounting and subsequent reporting and reducing the ability of companies
to engage in off-balance sheet financing. From the beginning of 2019, new standards for lease
accounting from both standard setters (IFRS 16 and SFAS 13 ASC 842 to be precise) came into
effect affecting all companies engaged in lease financing operating under these accounting
regimes. The new standards were jointly prepared and have a significant amount in common:
both require lessees to more or less eliminate off-balance sheet (OBS) leases from their
financial statements altogether by reclassifying leases previously accounted for as operating
leases into finance leases (with the exception of leases with a duration of 12 months or less
which shall remain as operating leases). Thus, the controversial benefits of operating lease
accounting were significantly reduced. The impacts on lessees’ financial statements are
potentially significant: capitalization of operating leases will increase the amount of both assets
and liabilities in firms’ balance sheets, potentially alter levels of reported profits and other
income statement items, and by extension, affect all ratios derived from impacted financial
statement items. Aside impacts purely in the domain of financial reporting, whether the new
standards have any economic consequences, will remain to be seen.
1.2 Lease accounting and management bonuses
The history of leasing paints a portrait of a domain in which accounting is challenged to meet
the underlying economic realities it is meant to describe. For that reason, the history of
operating leases in their form prior to 2019 has come to an end; almost all leases from now on,
under U.S. GAAP (U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles) and IFRS (International
Financial Reporting Standards), that is, are to be accounted for as finance leases. From now on,
material operating leases are rendered visible in balance sheets on both the asset and liability
side, as well as recorded as depreciation and interest expense in the income statement. It can be
argued that academia played a significant role as an agent of this change. Several motives for
4off-balance sheet financing have been proposed and identified in studies, and most appear to be
related in some way to managing figures in financial statements. Evidence of opportunism
exists. For instance, Imhoff & Thomas (1988) and Imhoff et al. (1991) show that managers
have been able to present material amounts of leases as operating leases instead of capitalizing
them. When SFAS 13 was implemented, most leases that are henceforth required to be
capitalized, were at the time restructured in ways as to avoid recognizing the associated assets
and liabilities. This way leverage ratios and performance measures were artificially improved.
Indeed, a body of study exists documenting the effects of operating lease capitalization on
financial statement items and accounting ratios (see section 2.2 of this thesis on capitalizations
effects on financial statements). Effects of capitalization of operating leases (and logically, the
omission of capitalization) on both balance sheets and income statements have been reported
as being of significant magnitude by researchers and practitioners. These effects include non-
reported assets and liabilities, overstated earnings (and other measures of profitability) etc.
This thesis is motivated by the interest to better understand both the amount of discretion
management truly has in determining items reported in financial statements and the extent to
which an opportunistic element is present in this domain. It is without a doubt that topics such
as this, addressing whether accounting has a behavioral aspect to it, have interested accounting
researchers for a long time and have prompted many studies with different takes and viewpoints
on the subject. Logically financial statement items which are a) most material, b) tend to have
high impact when tinkered with, and c) have a significant judgmental element to them, are most
interesting to study. Such items include goodwill, financial instruments and, as we have seen,
leases. Although leasing has been widely studied, fewer studies document evidence of the
relationship between CEO bonuses and lease accounting. This seems at least partly due to
mixed results in previous studies attempting it (Morais, 2014). The relationship is interesting
because, according to Murphy (1999, 2013), management bonuses are driven to a significant
degree by the same financial statement items other researchers have shown to be affected by
lease capitalization. This notion then raises the question of whether the choices related to lease
accounting have perhaps been partly driven by design of managerial incentive contracts and
managers aiming to maximize their compensation. One can’t help but being suspicious: have
managers historically been inclined towards favoring operating leases in order to maximize
their personal compensation as dictated by compensation contracts. For instance, imagine the
5following: if a managers’ compensation is partly based on a figure such as return on investment
(ROI) implying higher compensation when calculated returns on assets are high, he or she may
be inclined towards using operating leases thereby effectively hiding them from the balance
sheet and subsequently maximizing ROI by minimizing its denominator. The logic follows that
as operating and finance leases are treated differently in financial statements, this treatment
may have real world behavioral consequences not intended by regulators – perhaps
management bonus manipulation is one of them?
Thus, this thesis attempts to answer the question of whether or not operating leases in their prior
form have been used to influence accounting figures in such a way as to maximize
compensation via mechanisms related to bonus contracts. As regulation has recently changed,
it must be highlighted that this study is fundamentally backward looking in nature as it focuses
on companies’ financial statements before the implementation of ASC 842 (Accounting
Standards Codification 842). Although the significance of operating leases has severely
diminished, it is interesting to attempt to clarify whether managerial compensation has
historically been a determinant of decisions surrounding leases. Also, regarding companies
reporting mainly under national accounting standards (other than U.S. GAAP and accounting
regimes with similar lease standards), permitting long-term non-cancellable operating leases,
this question may still be relevant. Statistical inquiry into the matter could, for its part,
contribute to both the body of studies underlying regulators’ rationale for the recent changes in
legislation and accounting research covering management compensation and behavior. The
focus in this thesis is exclusively on the U.S. market and companies reporting under U.S. GAAP
as data on U.S. publicly listed companies is extensive - also, these companies operate under
lease reporting standards similar to IFRS.
1.3 Structure of the thesis
Structure of this thesis is as follows. Chapter two discusses research on lease accounting
relevant to this study covering the technical definitions of both operating and finance leases,
the mechanics of lease capitalization on a general level as well as studies addressing the effects
of lease capitalization on financial statement items and accounting ratios. Chapter three looks
6at management compensation initially on a general level discussing its components and drivers
and subsequently advancing to a focus on factors generally driving the level of CEO bonuses.
In chapter four, a framework synthesizing the previous two chapters is built from which a
hypothesis for the empirical portion of the study derived. Chapter five discusses the data,
sample, and methods including the empirical models for testing the hypothesis. Chapter six
presents subsequent results and findings while chapter seven discusses them. Chapter eight
concludes the thesis.
72. Research on lease accounting
This section covers research and theories of lease accounting relevant to this study. The first
part introduces the dichotomy of operating and finance leases under SFAS 13 (prior to the
jointly prepared new lease accounting standards by IAS and FASB issued in January 2019),
their conceptual characteristics/differences and criteria of classification laid out by the standard.
After this, the impacts of capitalization vs. non-capitalization of leases on financial statements
is discussed on both a theoretical and empirical level after which research on the subject is
introduced.
2.1 Accounting for leases
On the 1st of January 2019, new lease standards from both IASB and FASB came into effect
materially eliminating the use of operating leases altogether in financial statements of
companies reporting under them. These standards from the two accounting bodies were jointly
prepared with convergence in mind – as a consequence, they now resemble one another closely.
Effectively, the shared goal was to issue standards eliminating operating-lease driven off-
balance sheet financing altogether as this is believed to increase the usefulness, transparency
and completeness of financial statements while making them incrementally informative for
users (FASB, 2006). Compared to previous standards, which allowed a lease to be classified as
an operating lease under certain conditions, the new standards eliminate the classification of
leases as either operating and financial leases almost completely. Currently, under both
standards there now stands a single lease accounting model that requires lessees to “recognize
assets and liabilities for all leases with a term of more than 12 months, unless the underlying
asset is of low value”.
As this study focuses on U.S. companies with high operating lease intensities, it is backward-
looking in nature - an ex-post-take on a period prior to the current lease accounting standards.
The regulation under which data for the empirical part of the study (financial statement
information and 10-k form compensation information) has been recorded is U.S. GAAP,
specifically SFAS 13 (ASC 840). It is important to note that the lease standards of the U.S. and
8that of IAS/IFRS are in many ways very alike. Accounting for leases and the subsequent effects
on financial statements prepared under these two standards is therefore comparable.
SFAS 13 and its prescribed accounting is discussed below from the perspective of a lessee as
the empirical part of the study only looks at lessees’ financials. The concepts of operating leases
and financial leases are but briefly explained focusing on their core defining properties.
2.1.1 Classification of leases (SFAS 13, ASC 840)
In practice, generally speaking, leases in which the ownership of the leased asset is transferred
to the lessee at the end of the lease term following lease payments that represent the full value
of the asset, are called finance leases – all other leases are operating leases (Gavazza, 2010). In
accounting, the classification is based on set specific properties. Broadly speaking, the
classification of a lease as a finance lease depends on it meeting at least one of four criteria set
by SFAS 13 - all other leases are thereby operating leases. These criteria are:
1) The lease transfers the ownership of the property to the lessee by the end of the lease
term,
2) The lease contains a bargain purchase option,
3) The lease term is equal to 75 percent or more of the estimated economic life of the
leased asset (with some exceptions),
4) The present value at the beginning of the lease term of the minimum lease payments,
excluding payments representing executory cost, equals or exceeds 90 percent of the
fair value of the leased asset to the lessor at the inception of the lease (again, with some
exceptions).
As one can imagine, the criteria leave room for companies’ management to structure leases in
order to avoid capitalization. For instance, if all other criteria are unfulfilled, the lease term (#3)
can be negotiated to equal 74 percent of the economic life of the leased asset thus avoiding
capitalization altogether (Troberg, 2013). As Troberg (2013) points out, this was, among other
issues, pointed out by the G4+1 group (Anglo-Saxon accounting standard setters and IASC)
already in year 2000.
9Finance leases in accounting refer to long-term non-cancellable lease contracts transferring all
risks and rewards related to the asset from the lessor to the lessee (Troberg, 2013). The
accounting for a finance lease is significantly more complicated than for an operating lease and
materially resembles the debt financed purchase of an asset. The basic premise is that the at the
beginning of the lease term, the lessee shall record an asset and a liability equal to the present
value of the minimum lease payments during the lease term. Some executory cost such as
maintenance, insurances and taxes are excluded. If this present value of lease payments exceeds
the fair value of the asset in question, the amount recorded as asset and liability in the balance
sheet shall be the fair value of the leased asset. The present value of the minimum lease
payments is calculated with the interest rate implicit in the lease agreement or, if not available,
the lessee’s incremental borrowing rate is used. The recorded asset in the balance sheet shall
then be depreciated accordingly while the lease payment is allocated between the lease
obligation (i.e. capital repayment) and interest expense so as to produce a constant periodic
interest rate on the obligation in question (i.e. via the effective interest rate method).
On the other hand, the defining characteristics of operating leases are: 1) they are usually short-
term in nature, and 2) the lessor carries the substantial risks and rewards incidental to ownership
of the asset. When approaching the end of the lease term, an operating lease can be renewed
but there is no obligation to do so. Rent paid to the lessor is recorded as an operating expense
in the lessee’s income statement as it becomes payable - at no point in the lease term is any
asset or liability associated to the lease recorded in the balance sheet.
With neither finance nor operating leases is the legal ownership of the leased asset transferred
as in the case of a normal sell/buy transaction.
2.1.2 Effects of lease classification
Subsequent to the unequal accounting treatment of finance leases and operating leases, the
classification of a lease will affect both the income statement and balance sheet of a lessee in
varying ways. The differences between operating leases and finance leases are neatly described
by so called “constructive capitalization”, a method of lease capitalization by Imhoff et al.
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(1991, 1997) (also called the ILW method) designed to replicate the recognition of finance
leases as closely as possible. Constructive capitalization yields an estimate of assets and
liabilities that would be recognized if operating leases were accounted for as finance leases.
This method introduces six adjustments (Imhoff et al. 1993):
1) Liabilities increase by an estimate of the present value of future operating lease
commitments (abbreviated in literature as PVOL),
2) Assets increase by the unamortized value of the lease asset in most cases equal to the
PVOL at 𝑡 = 0 (abbreviated in literature as PVA),
3) A deferred tax effect,
4) An equity effect,
5) Effect on current period (before tax) net income which equals adding the current
period’s reported rent expense back to income and subtracting the depreciation and
interest charge recognized via capitalization,
6) Effect on operating income equal to the reported rent expense less the constructively
recognized amortization expense.
For companies with large operating lease portfolios, estimating impacts of lease capitalization
means adding something to the financial statement we think is missing – it is indirect in the
sense that while we cannot directly observe what their financial statements would look like if
operating lease commitments were accounted for as finance leases, we can at least see with
some accuracy what they have likely avoided from presenting. The analysis of financial
statement impacts is complex in the sense that effects on the income statement are not
independent of the effects on the balance sheet - nor is shareholder’s equity from assets or
liabilities etc. This makes a comprehensive description complex in the sense that for reasons of
interconnectedness, balance sheet effects cannot be described separately from income statement
effects.
The first and second effect listed by Imhoff et al. (1993) are the most apparent. Operating leases
entail no recorded asset or liability and therefore have no direct effect with the balance sheet
and subsequently derived accounting ratios. Finance leases on the other hand are accounted for
by recognizing a lease asset and a lease liability in the balance sheet the amount of which equals
the present value of the minimum lease payments (in most cases – although fair value is also a
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possibility as stated above). This increases the total amount of assets and liabilities on the
balance sheet causing changes in several common asset-based accounting ratios such as e.g.
return on assets (ROA) and leverage ratios (e.g. D/E) as presented in equations 1 and 2 below:
(1) 𝑅𝑂𝐴 = 𝑁𝑒𝑡 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 (𝑁𝐼)
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 (𝑇𝐴)
(2) 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 ቀ𝐷
𝐸
ቁ = 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑒𝑠
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠′𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
For accounting ratios measuring profitability involving balance sheet assets (denominator) and
income statement items such as net sales, EBIT(DA), NI etc. (numerator), any capitalization of
leases will cause dilution – weaker ratios so to speak – unless effects on income statement items
outweigh the change. The same applies to leverage ratios for which the increase in debt causes
degradation, asset-based efficiency ratios and etc.
The more nuanced, but nevertheless important, effects of capitalization on the balance sheet are
more easily understood after capitalization from the income statement’s perspective is
discussed. Finance and operating leases impact also the income statement unequally. First, the
general mechanics cause a categorical difference in expense recognition: costs are presented
under different income statement items. Costs incurred from operating leases are treated as
expenses in income statements of lessees, typically in the larger group of operating expenses
(OPEX). Examination quickly reveals that operating lease expenses enter into common profit
figures such as EBITDA and EBIT which are subsequently less the recorded OPEX expense.
Both profitability figures are impacted equally in absolute terms. This is not the case with
finance leases for which the lessee records depreciation according to a predefined plan (e.g.
straight-line depreciation) as well as interest charge based on the interest rate implicit in the
lease (or the companies’ incremental borrowing) rate and the outstanding lease liability
(according to the effective interest rate method). These allocated costs are shown within their
respective income statement items. As a consequence, with finance leases, EBITDA will not
include the allocated depreciation and interest charges of the lease while EBIT won’t include
allocated interest charges of the lease (but will include depreciation).
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The above examination, however, only presents the categorical differences in income statement
cost allocation and does not account for the temporal aspect of costs incurred. As such it is
insufficient in determining the differences between finance and operating lease accounting on
income statement items (and subsequently accounting ratios). The temporal aspect of costs
incurred refers to differences in period specific total lease expenses and their allocation
compared to the linear expenses enjoyed with operating leases. In practical terms, this results
in the “front-loading of costs”, i.e. costs are higher in the initial years of the lease for finance
leases compared to operating leases. In the later years, the effect is reversed (Imhoff et al. 1991).
The fundamental reason why costs are front-loaded in the case of finance leases compared to
operating leases is the relationship between the way assets are depreciated and liabilities repaid
with interest. Assets are depreciated (usually using the straight-line method - the default if a
pattern reflecting the consumption of economic benefits cannot be reliably determined), while
liabilities are reduced using the effective interest rate method. Unless assets are depreciated
using a present value amortization method, which according to Jennings and Marques (2013)
and Imhoff et al. (1993), would eliminate the effect of front-loading of costs on net income as
the total (finance) lease expense would equal the actual lease payment (cash flow equal to the
expense recorded with operating leases), the combination of interest paid to the liability and
depreciation causes net income to be less than with operating leases in the initial year of the
lease (Imhoff, 1991). The paper published by Imhoff et al. (1991) illustrates the front-loading
of costs, which is shown below in Figure 1: the grey area between the curve “total finance lease
expense” and “total operating lease expenditure” represents the total amount of “front-loaded
costs” before 𝑡1, after which the effect is reversed.
It can generally be stated that when the lease term equals the useful life of the asset, the asset
is depreciated according to a method other than present value amortization, and the interest rate
used in lease accounting 𝑟 > 0, profits (net income) are greater in the initial periods of the lease
term and lower in the second period when operating leases are used over finance leases. This
notion is argued by multiple studies (Nelson, 1963; Ashton, 1985; Imhoff et al., 1991, 1993,
1997; El-Gazzar et al.,1986; Jennings & Marques 2013) and can easily be observed through
constructive capitalization.
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Figure 1. Relationship between operating lease expenses vs. finance lease expenses (Imhoff
et al. 1991, p. 59)
This also directly effects deferred taxes via before-tax net income from which taxes are
calculated; the magnitude of impact on deferred taxes is thus determined by the change in
before-tax net income and therefore also affects balance sheet liabilities (Imhoff et al, 1997).
Over the useful life of the lease, the sum of interest and depreciation will equal the operating
lease rental expense (Bennett & Bradbury, 2003).
What’s more is that the capitalization of leases also reflects on operating income measures
(EBIT and EBITDA) in an unexpected way. Above, the general categorical difference in
expense recognition in the income statement was discussed - namely that the rent expense
associated with operating leases enters into operating income measures equally in every period,
while with finance leases, its divided into depreciation and interest thus effecting cost allocation
between EBIT and EBITDA. This is a cost classification difference and does not take into
account the differences in total amount of costs incurred each year under operating leases and
finance leases. “Front-loading of costs” tells us that the sum of interest expense and depreciation
for early years of the lease is larger than the equivalent rental expense associated with the same
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lease if it is accounted for as an operating lease. Thus, the unobvious consequence of
capitalization is that both EBIT and EBITDA will improve (under the general assumptions) in
absolute terms under not only because of cost classification (Imhoff et al., 1997; Nelson, 1963).
This follows from the present value technique used to estimate the PVOL and PVA from the
minimum lease payments of operating leases. In the absence of interest charges, the discounting
of these cash flows to their present value and allocation using straight-line depreciation causes
the depreciation charge reducing EBIT to be less than the rent expense associated with
operating lease accounting. Thus, EBIT improves by 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 −
𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 , while EBITDA improves by the total amount of rent expense as no
charges are recorded in EBITDA with finance leases (as per the discussed classification effect).
The situation is however more ambiguous if another method of depreciation is used, say a
diminishing balance method with a high (aggressive) depreciation rate. Such a method can,
hypothetically, reverse the effect on operating income as early year depreciation can be higher
than the annual rent expense associated with an operating lease. There is, however, no economic
reason in favoring finance leases to operating leases in order to maximize operating profits if
one decides to eliminate the advantage by maintaining a high depreciation rate for assets (note
that straight-line is the default in GAAP). In fact, the only advantage that suffering the “front-
loading of costs” can bring in the early years of the lease on the income statement side is the
tax shield resulting in tax savings (which is a cash-flow related benefits). Duke et al. (2009)
however report of synthetic leases (in the U.S. context) which allow the accounting of leases as
operating leases while retaining the tax benefits of finance leases (i.e. retaining the status of a
finance lease in U.S. tax code).
After comprehending the general effects of capitalization on income statements, the more
nuanced effects of capitalization on balance sheets can be discussed. Another way of stating
the above is that the effect on equity through net income follows from the asset-liability ratio
(ALR); the ratio of the capitalized operating lease asset to the capitalized operating lease
liability at time 𝑡 of the life of the asset’s useful life. Depreciation and effective interest rate
method, both reducing their respective sides of the balance sheet, occur at different rates
causing an impact on the income statement and finally net income. This in turn affects
shareholder’s equity which, in a way, “collects” the annual disparity in reduction of lease assets
and lease liabilities ultimately balancing out both sides of the balance sheet. As Imhoff et al.
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(1997) note, income statement effects flow through to shareholder’s equity, and therefore, the
after-tax income statement effects may be directly calculated through the change in
shareholder’s equity from one year to the next.  According to the authors, this implies that
income statement details are not required to calculate the impacts that constructive
capitalization has on net income. Therefore, through annual net income transferring into
shareholders equity, shareholder’s equity will in early years of lease capitalization due to front-
loading of costs, ceteris paribus, stand in lesser amount compared to a situation in which leases
are accounted as operating leases. In later years, it will eventually begin to recover until a state
of identical effects is reached compared to operating leases at the end of the leased assets useful
life (note that the effect is therefore cumulative and shareholders’ equity will throughout the
asset useful life be less than in the case of operating lease accounting).
2.2 Research on effects of lease capitalization
Accounting ratios are widely used as tools for decision making by companies’ management,
loan officers, investors, tax authorities etc. – the primary users of financial statements so to
speak. The effects of capitalization of operating leases on financial statements has been studied
over the decades with mostly consistent results. These inquiries show a number of general and
repetitive results confirming the above description of lease capitalization mechanics. From the
perspective of this study, the focus is essentially on what is avoided by choosing to finance
assets with operating leases instead of purchasing the assets outright or using finance leases.
The perspective also shifts to some extent from the absolute impact of capitalization on
financial statement items to accounting-based measures and ratios used to evaluate company
performance – their derivatives.
The earliest studies on the effects of capitalization trace back to Nelson’s (1963) study which
answers two different questions: firstly, what are the effects of operating lease capitalization on
financial accounting ratios and secondly, are ratios more meaningful after capitalization
(leading to improved decision usefulness). A sample containing 11 companies that undergo
capitalization of operating lease commitments reported in their financial statements is studied.
Nelson finds significant changes in the sample companies’ financial ratios and highlights
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especially how companies in the same industries are able to report highly variable ratios as a
result of lease accounting choices only. For instance, leverage measured as debt to equity (D/E)
increased significantly with a high of 164.7 percent for company A and a low of 6.3 percent for
company K. The increases in the ratio were fairly linear within the sample and the average
increase was 69 percent. Change in profitability measured by return on total assets averaged
zero within the sample involving both improvements and deteriorations for individual
companies. The methodology of this early investigation is somewhat different from later studies
using the ILW-method – income statement effects are not accounted for comprehensively as
the study presumes that the annual depreciation plus interest expense for financial leases equal
the annual lease rentals for operating leases. Therefore, in light of later studies, only balance
sheet effects noted by the study warrant attention. Out of 15 ratios tested, only 2 improved by
means of capitalization – the rest deteriorated.
Ashton (1985) studied the effects of operating lease capitalization on financial statements in
the UK context and noted effects to be reflected in such financial statement items as interest
charges, depreciation, fixed assets, accumulated depreciation and outstanding debt. The study
looks at whether capitalization of operating leases has a statistically significant impact on main
indicators of companies’ financial performance, and whether the choice of companies in the
sample to voluntarily capitalize leases was driven by economic consequences. The effects of
capitalization on various performance measures was mixed: Ashton finds that while
performance measures improved on average, the asset turnover ratio and gearing deteriorated
(which is expected due to liabilities and assets generally increasing). However, the paired t-
tests showed that out of the impacts, only one concerning leverage ratio (gearing) was
statistically significant. Indeed, Ashton notes that while the mean changes in performance
measures were relatively small, the variations were rather high implying that, to the extent that
the sample is representative, there will be considerable variation in the effect capitalization will
have on different companies. Thus, Ashton draws two conclusions: first that companies on
average can expect only their gearing ratio to be affected by capitalization and more
importantly, second, that capitalization has little impact on performance measures.
Presenting the constructive capitalization method, which would later become a standard
technique of lease capitalization in accounting literature, Imhoff et al. (1991) studied the
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restaurant chain McDonald’s and found that by capitalizing their rent commitments in 1998,
the restaurant’s ROA declined by 9 percent and D/E ratio increased by 30 percent. Their
evidence also suggests that capitalizing leases has significant effects on accounting figures and
ratios with significant cross- and within-industry variation. By applying constructive
capitalization on 7 pairs on companies, they noted an average decrease in ROA for leasing-
inclined companies (high lessees) of 34 percent compared to 10 percent for the less leasing-
inclined kind (low lessees). The average increase in D/E ratio for high lessees was 191 percent
compared to 47 percent to low lessees. It is worth noting that their 1991 study assumes that the
impact of capitalization on net income is negligible when assessing effects on performance
measures – an assumption they later withdrew in their 1997 study.
Imhoff et al. (1993, 1997) show that in addition to their 1991 study, which found material
balance sheet effects (also noted in 1993 and 1997) caused by capitalization of operating leases,
capitalization in addition causes material income statement effects on net income (bottom line)
and operating profit (income before interest expenses and unusual items). The 1993 study finds
that the median leverage ratio within their sample consisting of airlines and groceries (measured
as debt/asset) experienced an increase of 12 percent. The median percentage adjustments to net
income for airlines was -22 percent and -6 percent for groceries. Interestingly, the study notes
that even considering the reversed effect of front-loading of costs at the later years for
capitalized leases, the capitalization of leases tends to have a negative effect on reported net
income because the typical operating lease for the sample companies is less than halfway
through its useful life. Their 1997 study performs a similar capitalization of operating leases as
1991 (this time on Southwest Airlines through years 1990-1994) and finds net income
(earnings) to generally decline. They also note that ROA and ROE are systematically overstated
through the years when operating leases remain uncapitalized – for ROE the annual percentage
overstatement ranges from 4 to 86 percent, while for ROA 27 to 51 percent. The potential
materiality of adjusting the income statement along with the balance sheet in capitalization is
confirmed; with Southwest Airlines, ROE is in fact higher through the years when only the
balance sheet is adjusted compared to operating leases remaining uncapitalized. The impacts of
only adjusting the balance sheet on ROA were not as severe, as the change in the ratio is
dominated by the growth in average total assets.
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Beattie et al. (1998) study the effects of capitalization on common profitability and gearing
ratios on a sample of 232 UK companies. Along the now common notion that assets and
liabilities of companies grow significantly from capitalization of operating leases (operating
leases classified as long-term liabilities represented 39 percent of long-term debt on sample
company balance sheets, while capitalized operating lease assets represented 6 percent of pre-
capitalization total assets – both, however, with wide variation between high and low
companies), Beattie et al. find statistically significant changes in most of the sample companies’
profitability and gearing ratios at the 1 and 5 percent level. The study notes a profit margin
(EBIT/sales) increase of 12 percent, return on equity (ROE) increase of 5 percent, return on
assets (ROA) decrease of 11 percent, asset-turnover decrease of 13 percent, and an increase of
260 percent in gearing. These findings are consistent with previous studies (mentioned above)
of Ashton and Imhoff et al., with the distinction that Beattie et al. found changes in financial
ratios statistically significant, whereas Ashton did not (he concluded the effects of capitalization
thus immaterial).
Goodacre (2003) along the lines of Beattie et al. (1998) studies 102 UK general retail companies
and assesses the effects of operating lease capitalization on nine performance ratios. The study
finds that the ratio of operating lease liabilities to long-term debt is on average 3.3, operating
leases are on average 37 times the level of finance leases, and operating lease assets represent
28 percent of balance sheet assets. This noted importance of the PVOL and PVA highlight the
possibility of subsequent distortions in financial statements caused by non-capitalization of
leases. As for income statement profitability measures, EBIT was found to increase by 23
percent within the retail sector, while importantly, the effects on net income depended on the
maturity of the lease portfolio. Capitalization is found to affect operating profitability measures
significantly and the study notes that this may have important economic consequences in
decision contexts where performance is judged against a benchmark, such as executive
compensation schemes. For companies with growing operating lease portfolios (i.e. increasing
avoidance of “front-loading of costs”), the reduction in mean net profit was found to be 7
percent on average. The authors note that due to variance in the sample companies’ operating
lease intensity and levels of reported profits, some companies, especially the ones with high
levels of operating leases or low levels of reported profit, would feel effects more drastic than
the average might imply.
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Bennet & Bradbury (2003) examine the impacts of constructive capitalization of operating
leases on 38 public companies listed on the New Zealand Stock Exchange (accounting for
leases in the same fashion as per IAS and Anglo-American standards). They report an 8.8
percent mean increase in assets, 22.9 percent mean increase in assets and a 3 percent mean
decrease in equity. The average leverage ratio (total debt/total assets) increases from 46.9 to
51.9 percent and ROA (net income/total assets) falls from 12.6 to 11.5 percent. The authors
conclude that in addition to having deteriorating effect on leverage ratios, capitalization of
operating leases also decreases liquidity and profitability ratios.
Lückerath-Rovers (2007) studies 278 Dutch companies through financial years 2000-2004 and
finds similar effects of capitalization on financial ratios as previous studies. On performance
measures, capitalization caused the mean ROE to increase by 3.6 percent and ROA decrease by
7.8 percent. Importantly, Lückerath-Rovers finds that capitalization driven balance sheet effects
are slightly stronger than income statement effects. Fülbier et al. (2008) performed a similar
study on 90 German listed companies through years 2003-2004. In their sample, on the balance
sheet, mean assets increased by 20.4 percent and mean liabilities by 77.3 percent. On the income
side they noted a significant increase in the mean EBIT, 8.1 percent, while mean net income
only increased by 0.9 percent. However, interestingly, the minimum net income in the sample
dropped 2.4 percent while the maximum increase by 9.6 percent implying the existence of
asymmetric effects. The authors note that generally low EBIT and NI effects imply that average
operating lease expenses are only slightly higher than depreciation (causing a slight
improvement in EBIT), while almost on par with the sum of depreciation and interest (causing
very little change in NI). In general, they noted only minor effects were observed for
profitability ratios and performance metrics ranging from -2.0 percent for ROE to 2.9 percent
for profit margin (EBIT/revenue). P/E ratios and EPSs are also studied: mean P/E falls by 1.4
percent while mean EPS increases by 1.6 percent - it must also be noted that these figures are
driven by high variation in the sample as the median corresponding figures are -0.2 percent and
0.2 percent. The authors find the results to be in line with prior studies, however, reporting
generally weaker effects – they attribute the difference to higher discount rates used in early
papers. Moreover, industry-specific results are highlighted; the impact of capitalization is
stronger in fashion and retail whereas many industries remain unaffected.
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Durocher (2008) intentionally takes a somewhat different approach and selects sample
companies not from industries with high lease-intensities but rather large companies
irrespective of industry. He ends up with Canada’s 100 largest companies (by revenue) and
studies their financial years 2002-2003. He finds the typical increases in assets and liabilities
as other studies but fails to find statistically significant (at 5 percent level) impacts on ROA,
ROE and EPS. This result is interpreted to mean that simply replacing operating lease expenses
(with depreciation and interest) does not significantly affect these ratios. However, as with other
studies, the author notes that even with the median results being what they are, there still exists
high intra-firm variability with some companies affected drastically while other face barely any
effects. The weak results on performance measures is also, as in Goodacre (2003), according to
the authors, explained by the maturity of the average lease portfolio (the average expired life
of the portfolio is seven years while total life was 17 – i.e. closing in on 50 percent expired).
The effect of model assumptions is also highlighted.
Duke et al. (2009) find that capitalization impacts their S&P 500 based sample by increasing
the amount of liabilities on average by 11.3 percent while assets 3.97 percent. High variance
occurs in this sample too: for the top 91 firms the respective figures are 34.2 percent and 11.0
percent. Average retained earnings, net of tax impact, were reduced by 7.14 percent (the effect
on retained earnings is cumulative as it is a sum of all annual effects on net income). For the 91
major users of operating leases, the equivalent effect on retained earnings is a 12.99 percent
decline. The study divides the sample into two groups based on whether or not the sample
companies’ lease portfolio maturities have passed the midpoint after which capitalization
effects on NI turn positive compared to operating leases (depreciation + interest < operating
lease rental). The group for which lease capitalization had a positive income effect showed an
average 5.12 percent increase in net income while for the other group with negative income
effects the average decline was 3.59 percent. The study highlights the possibility that lease
capitalization offers large U.S. companies an opportunity to hide debt, assets and manipulate
income. Indeed, the tone is rather explicit, unlike in many other studies, in suggesting that
companies engage opportunistically in such action and regulators should take action in deter it.
Also, Grossman & Grossman (2010) studying the top 200 Fortune 500 companies as well as
Branswijck et al. (2011) studying the impacts of a lease standards treating all material leases as
finance leases (i.e. capitalizing leases) on companies in Belgium and Netherlands (128
21
companies listed on Euronext Brussels and 116 companies listed on Euronext Amsterdam at
April 2010) saw similar effects as described above in previous studies.
The results of the studies indicate that capitalization of operating leases can have a material
impact on financial statements and subsequent accounting ratios and performance measures.
The literature also points out that there is clearly ambiguity in lease capitalization and its effects
on financial statements (especially in income effects). Imhoff et al. (1997) state this point
explicitly: the effects of off-balance sheet operating leases are both significant and
unpredictable in direction (i.e. both positive and negative effects on NI, differences between
EBIT/EBITDA etc.). Thus, it may not be surprising that balance sheet effects are explicitly
found to be stronger than income statement effects in at least Lückerath-Rovers (2007),
Goodacre (2003), Beattie et al. (2008) and Durocher (2008. Also, most studies note that there
is high variance among the sample companies’ profitability measures – this implies effects are
different for some companies than others due to operating lease intensity. Further, while several
studies noted that income effects ranged between negative and positive for sample companies,
an asymmetry was present skewing the average income effect to the positive side for non-
capitalizers. More importantly, with some companies the results can be extreme. What seems
to be evident as well, is that these studies point that lease structuring is indeed a potent tool for
earnings management. To stir the pot even further, Fülbier et al. (2008) find that within their
sample, the average NI change is very small implying an average lease portfolio halfway
through its useful life (when the sum of annual depreciation and interest payments equal annual
operating lease expenses). Duke et al. (2009) report similar findings; the general effects of lease
capitalization on sample companies’ average income depends heavily on whether or not the
proportion of operating leases to their investment assets (lease intensity) is growing or
declining. Fülbier et al. (2008) note that all studies operate under model assumptions (discount
rates, assumptions of lease portfolio maturity etc.) hampering comparability. They also find
that effects on performance measures are limited.
Both the theoretical examination of capitalizations effects on financial statements as well as
literature review of the subject show that both the implications and evidence on the effects of
lease capitalization are to some extent mixed. Unequivocal determination of the effects of
capitalization and thus, associated affectivity to a financial agent, is hampered by layers and
factors adding to ambiguity - operating leases and finance leases do not exist in a vacuum and
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are intrinsically thoroughly neither positive nor negative. These factors include the above
discussed temporality (front-loading of costs), the maturity of the lease portfolio, which income
statement item is under focus (EBITDA, EBIT, NI etc.). Also, as the level of analysis shifts
from a more clear-cut view of financial statement items to their derivative counterparts
(accounting-based performance measures), the additional complexity brings with it another
layer of ambiguity. When ratios are calculated (i.e. ROI, ROA etc.) both the numerators and
denominators are affected by capitalization - and not necessarily in any linear fashion. Whether
such ratios improve or deteriorate depend on multiple factors. However, some things are clear:
firstly, effects do exist and secondly, under the right setting (regardless whether facilitated by
chance or intention) elements encouraging opportunistic behavior are present. This is not
surprising as theoretical examination implies that effects of capitalization on performance
measures varies widely depending on the inputs used in lease accounting (providing significant
flexibility for managers).
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3. Management incentives and compensation
Executive compensation remains a widely discussed topic in academia and especially in the
field of financial economics, where, according to Murphy (1999), before 1980, there were no
more than barely 1-2 papers published per year. Nowadays, the publishing rate is much higher
and executive compensation is seemingly one of the more covered and controversial topics
emanating from the corporate world. Indeed, it is no exaggeration to state that the surrounding
political debate especially in the U.S. has from time to time reached substantial proportions
(Occupy Wall Street -protests, Enron etc.). For the purposes of this study, a look at executive
compensation is in order to establish the current academic findings linking executive
compensation to financial statement items and accounting ratios. However, no attempt at a
comprehensive take on the literature is attempted as it would not serve the purpose of this study.
The primary interest is to examine literature concerning the composition of executive total pay
and which of its components may be typically determined by accounting-based performance
measures and to what extent. An understanding of the nature and mechanics of executive
compensation is crucial in examining whether operating leases (and lease structuring) act as a
tool for self-interested executives to artificially increase their compensation – phenomena called
rent-seeking behavior.
This chapter looks first at the theoretical backgrounds of executive compensation and moves
on to describe the level and components of CEO compensation in the U.S. on a general level.
Secondly, as this study focuses largely on CEO’s cash bonuses instead of other components,
the relationship between cash bonuses and their underlying performance measures are
discussed.
3.1 Brief view of executive compensation theory
The separation of ownership and control lies at the heart of executive compensation and has
been studied extensively. Its (modern) roots can be traced arguably to Jensen & Meckling’s
(1976) seminal “Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership
structure. (For context, the article has been cited 87 524 times according to Google Scholar at
the time of writing this in April 2020.) Agency theory, as it is called, describes the fundamental
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conflict between owners of firms and self-interested managers acting on their behalf; owners
are interested in maximizing firm value while managers are concerned with maximization of
their individual well-being (a fundamental assumption). Thus, executive compensation plans
act in order to align the interests of risk-averse self-interested CEOs with those of shareholders.
It’s hardly surprising then, as Murphy (2013) notes, that much of the research on CEO
incentives has its theoretical roots in agency theory. A closer look reveals that academic
literature is divided roughly into two camps with regards to the theoretical grounds explaining
trends and structures of executive compensation: the “efficient contracting” camp and the
“managerial power” camp (Frydman and Jenter, 2010; Murphy, 2013).  The efficient
contracting camp holds that the composition and level of executive compensation is determined
by competitive markets for managerial talent with incentives structured to optimize firm value,
whereas the managerial power group finds that these factors are determined by captive board
members catering to rent-seeking, entrenched CEOs (CEOs holding power over their pay
setting process) (Murphy, 2013). Both Frydman and Jenter (2010) and Murphy (1999, 2013) in
their comprehensive reviews on executive compensation literature maintain that neither camp
alone explain these phenomena; both are important but neither fully consistent alone and in
relation to the available evidence. Indeed, according to Frydman and Jensen (2010), there is no
consensus of the relative importance of these two camps in explaining the determinants of the
typical CEO pay.
3.2 Structure and level of CEO compensation
Executive compensation literature has mainly focused on CEO pay (Aggarwal & Samwick,
2003). It also appears that at least a somewhat significant proportion of the literature uses the
words “executive” and “CEO” virtually interchangeably which can quickly be inferred from
e.g. Murphy (1991, 2013) - two comprehensive takes on the executive compensation literature.
The following literature review relies on Murphy’s work (1991, 2013) extensively as they are
comprehensive, written to guide research in executive compensation, and authored by a leading
researcher in the field of executive compensation.
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Frydman and Jensen (2010) point out that the evolution of CEO compensation can be divided
broadly into two time periods – the period prior to 1970 and the period following it. Prior to
1970, pay of CEOs was relatively low with little dispersion across top managers. After the
1970s, on the other hand, levels of pay grew significantly with widening dispersion across top
managers and firms. The largest surge in levels of CEO pay was observed during the years 1990
and 2000 (Frydman & Jensen, 2010; Murphy, 2013).  Figure 2 below from Murphy (2013, p.
225) shows the average equity and non-equity pay for CEOs in S&P 500 firms during the years
1970-2011.
Figure 2. Average CEO grant-date pay over time (Murphy 2013, p. 225)
The figure shows the evolution of average grant-date pay (i.e. not the ultimate realized payout
after stocks vest and options are exercised but rather the ex-ante grant-date value) for CEOs
during 1970-2011 based on Forbes surveys (years 1970-1991) adjusted for inflation and
Standards & Poors Compustat database (years 1992-2011). A recent report from Economic
Policy Institute (Mishel & Wolfe, 2019) suggests that the (realized) pay for CEOs in top 350
S&P 500 firms in 2017 (ranked by sales) was roughly level to the average during 2010-2017
(although there appears to be significant volatility involved with realized pay as opposed to
grant-date pay as per Murphy). It is worth mentioning, however, that the above average annual
CEO pay over time is amplified to some extent due to the use of averages instead of medians.
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This is caused by the distribution of annual average compensation becoming more skewed over
time as a small number of CEOs on the top have enjoyed accelerated growth in total
compensation compared to most (Frydman and Jensen, 2010; Murphy, 2013). Therefore, a look
at the “typical CEO” (the median) is more representative of the population as a whole.
To better understand the rise in CEO-pay in the recent decades, a look at the composition of
pay packages is warranted. The division of total pay into its components and sub-components
is described with more or less resolution depending on the author, but for clarities sake, the
deconstruction of Murphy (1999) is used (the differences are immaterial and rather of the
semantic kind). Murphy (1999) notes that even though there is substantial heterogeneity in pay
practices across firms and industries, most pay packages of CEOs (“executives” in the original
text) are the sum of the base salary, an annual bonus tied to accounting performance, stock
options, long-term incentive plans (including restricted stock plans and multi-year accounting
performance plans). Executives also receive “broad-based” employee benefit-plans and receive
special benefits including life insurances and supplemental executive retirement plans (SERPs).
The distribution of total pay into its sub-components and their evolution during the period
between 1992-2011 is elegantly presented in Figure 3 from Murphy below (2013, p. 226). The
figure shows median grant-date total compensation for CEOs in S&P 500 firms during 1992-
2011. The differences of annual total pay compared to the average pay in Figure 2 highlight the
skewness in the pay distribution. Murphy’s analysis clearly shows how CEO median pay has
evolved during the period of analysis: the role of base pay has reduced significantly in overall
compensation but nevertheless remained roughly level in absolute terms. At the same time,
bonus payouts have roughly doubled, while the role of stock options and restricted stock has
skyrocketed. Indeed, this rise in the level of compensation has been studied and a number of
explanations have been offered ranging from weak corporate governance to greater demand for
managers with a more general skillset as documented in Shue & Townsend (2017). From the
point of view of this study, fundamental reasons for the upward trend in CEO pay is not the
issue at hand and therefore merits no further examination. What is nevertheless important is to
understand the composition and relative roles of the different components in overall CEO pay
- these are described below.
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Figure 3. Median CEO compensation over time (Murphy 2013, p. 226)
Base pay or salary of a CEO is the amount of the overall compensation which does not vary
with performance (although good performance can lead to a higher base salary) (Balsam, 2002).
According to Murphy (1999) base pay of CEOs is typically determined by an industry-specific
benchmark based on industry salary surveys adjusted for company size through size groupings
or log-linear regressions with size being typically measured using company revenues or market
capitalization. The salary-determination process gets substantial attention from executives
considering it only comprises a relatively small portion of executive total pay and according to
Murphy (1999), this is explained by salary being the key component in executive employment
contracts and representing the “fixed component” of total pay for risk-averse executives.
Additionally, most other components of compensation exist in some specified relation to base
salary (percentage of base salary etc.).
Bonuses are a component of executive pay that can be conditioned upon individual, group or
corporate performance. For most executives, the bonus plan is dependent mainly on group
performance and is a part of a plan covering a larger group of employees (Balsam, 2002).
According to Murphy (1999), annual bonus plans are offered by virtually every profit-seeking
company to its top executives and are based on a single year’s performance. They consist of
three building blocks: performance measures, performance standards and the pay-performance
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relation. The typical bonus plan described by Murphy (1999) has a threshold performance
above which bonuses are paid (the minimum bonus), a “target bonus” paid for achieving the
performance standard, and typically a cap on bonuses (the maximum). Balsam (2002) also notes
that some executive compensation contracts guarantee a bonus regardless of performance, but
in light of Murphy (1991) this seems untypical of firms. Conyon et al. (2011), Murphy (1999),
Murphy (2013), Ittner (1997) and others note that bonuses in the U.S. are mainly based on
measures of accounting performance – it is safe to say, apparently a generally accepted
observation in literature. According to Murphy (1999), however, bonuses are not based only on
performance measures but rather on performance measures relative to a standard. Such a
standard can be, for instance, a profitability measure compared to 1) the budgeted profitability
measure, 2) last year’s profitability, 3) peer-group performance or etc.
Stock options are contracts giving the holder the right to buy the underlying asset for a pre-
specified and fixed “exercise” (or “strike”) price for a prespecified term or a certain date.
Murphy (1999) notes that executive options typically vest over time (e.g. 25 percent become
exercisable in each of the four years following the grant). Such options will have value to the
executive when the firm’s stock is valued higher than the strike price. The strike price for the
option is typically set level with the stocks’ share price on the grant date and, therefore, the
value of the option for the executive lies in the performance of the stock price and its final value
upon becoming exercisable (Balsam, 2002). If the firm’s share price is below the fixed strike
price upon the date of exercising, the option is worthless.
Restricted stock refers to grants of shares that are forfeited under certain conditions (usually
related to employment longevity) (Murphy, 1999). Unlike stock options, they have no
derivative properties such as strike prices etc. and are valuable as long as the stock price is over
zero. Shares can and are also granted unrestricted (Balsam, 2002).
While this description of executive compensation components is far from comprehensive and
leaves out smaller components and other categories such as pension, it suffices in facilitating a
basis for understanding CEO compensation and covers material elements for the purposes of
this study.
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3.3 Underlying performance measures of cash bonuses
The focus is now turned to cash bonuses. As noted above, cash bonus payouts are mainly based
on financial metrics, i.e. performance measures derived from accounting figures in financial
statements whereas the drivers for other components of executive pay (notwithstanding base
pay) are more complex (or even ambiguous). The most common up-to-date financial metrics
used in compensation contracts are hard to find from academic literature – this domain appears
to be one of industry consultants rather than scholars. However, research documenting relevant
accounting performance measures does exist. Within the context of this thesis, the interest is
identifying whether cash bonuses rely on measures affected by capitalization of operating
leases.
The popularity of accounting-based performance measures in compensation contracts can be
argued to be largely due to the relative ease of obtaining necessary information. Financial
statements offer a fairly reliable way of tracking firm performance as they are both regulated in
line with public interest as well as audited by independent accounting professionals. Other
subsidiary reasons may exist as well, e.g., as per the academia has argued, fair value accounting
and subsequent earnings measures should track firm value with some positive correlation, and
thus, theoretically act as a mechanism of aligning the interest of managers with that firms’
shareholders.
It is no surprise then that traditionally firms have used mostly financial metrics such as net
earnings and return on investment (ROI) in bonus contracts (Ittner et al.,1997). Ittner et al.
(1997) found that in their sample of 317 firms, the mean weight placed on non-financial
measures when evaluating CEO performance was 13.4 percent rendering it overall much less
significant than financial measures. Also, interestingly, fewer than 2 percent of companies
included in their sample used non-financial performance measures in their long-term
compensation plans. However, Perry & Zettner (2001) find that 69 percent of their random
sample of companies (S&P 500 and Midcap 400) use some form of non-financial performance
measure in determining total compensation of CEOs (not bonuses in particular). Also, a
consequential temporal aspect exists as Ittner et al. (1997) note: most companies use short-term
or annual bonus measures in their executive compensation contracts. This implies that as the
relationship between short-term bonuses and actions taken by managers (ultimately recorded in
30
the general ledgers of companies during a particular financial year) is easier to understand than
if the time-frame were longer, managers, provided they are inclined to such action, have a clear
incentive for managing accounting figures related to their personal compensation.
Ittner et al. (1997) found that in their sample of 312 firms using financial measures in the bonus
contracts, companies used on average 1.7 financial performance measures of which net income,
operating income and earnings per share were the most popular. Net income was used by 27.2
percent, operating income by 25.3 percent and EPS 28.5 percent of firms in the sample.
Perry & Zenner (2001) selected a random sample of 100 S&P 500 and 100 Midcap 400 firms
and documented the performance measures in compensation contracts by executive
compensation committees to determine CEO compensation (including bonuses). Within this
sample of companies, 97 percent used some type of financial performance measure to determine
CEO compensation. The results are interesting: 60 percent of companies’ compensation
committees mention using some form of net income (with or without non-recurring events), 38
percent mention EPS, 32 percent sales and 31 percent ROE. Less frequently used measures
include shareholder returns as used by 20 percent, ROA with 15 percent, and profit margins
with 13 percent.
The most comprehensive research on cash bonuses and performance measures appear to be in
Murphy’s (1999) study presenting interesting findings. In this study (or rather summary of
studies), Murphy asserts that most descriptions of executive bonus contracts in 1999 were non-
representative, anecdotal, or gathered non-randomly from voluntary disclosures in companies
proxy statements, and thus instead, Murphy studied the usage of performance measures based
on “Annual Incentive Plan Design Survey” in 1996-1997 by Towers Perrin (nowadays Willis
Towers Watson) which documents performance measures used in top executive bonus plans by
177 publicly traded U.S. firms. Although both financial and non-financial performance
measures were in use, almost all companies rely on at least one measure of accounting
performance (including revenues, net income, pre-tax income, operating profits (EBIT),
economic value added) or accounting based ratios (such as ROA or EPS). Of the survey sample,
less than half (38 percent) used only a single performance measure while the rest used two or
more measures. Of the companies using only a single performance measure, 96 percent use an
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accounting measure as described above, while for the rest (using two or more measures) 62
percent of the used measures were accounting-based measures. Murphy states: “Overall, 161
of the 177 sample firms (91 %) explicitly use at least one measure of accounting profits in their
bonus plans.” It is worth noting that in the case of the 16 remaining firms, while bonuses were
largely discretionary, they may be tied to accounting performance through the board’s
subjective assessment of performance. Also, typically annual bonus contracts are largely
explicit with limited room for discretion (Murphy, 1999).
Based on Murphy (1999) (and Perry & Zenner, 2001), earnings stand out as the single most
important group of performance measures used by companies relying on a single performance
measure in bonus contracts. Earnings in Towers Perrin survey’s context refer not only to net
income, but also pre-tax income and returns on assets equity and capital. All in all, out of the
68 firms using a single performance measure, 67 percent turned to earnings, the second most
important measure was EBIT (13 percent) (referring in this context also to operating income,
EBITDA, and other cash flow measures) while third place went to EVA (9 percent) (defined to
generally equal operating income less a charge for capital). Firms with two or more
performance measures also list earnings and EBIT as the most used measures of performance.
Taking secondary performance measures into account introduces a large number of non-
financial measures into the mix. Notwithstanding the measure “individual performance”, which
stands out as relatively popular (although its ambiguity implies that it may contain a variety of
measures both financial and non-financial itself) the popularity of non-financial measures is
distributed fairly evenly with no single measure standing out. This implies that non-financial
measures are mainly used in addition to accounting-based performance measures, and
regardless of whether a firm’s bonus contract uses one or more performance measures,
accounting based measures of either operating profits or bottom-line earnings such as net
income take precedent. Indeed, Murphy (1999) finds that the primary determinant of executive
bonuses is accounting profits.
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4. Hypothesis development
4.1 Synthesis
So far, topics of lease accounting covering both the technical accounting framework of SFAS
13 and capitalizations’ effects on financial statements as well as management compensation
(with a focus on the structure and drivers of different components of executive pay) have been
separately discussed. As noted in the introduction, the topic of this study is to examine whether
operating lease intensity is partly explained by management compensation and thus, the above
topics require synthesis.
Whether or not managers are incentivized to choose operating leases over finance leases in
order to maximize their compensation is dependent on both the effects of (non-) capitalization
of leases and the design of CEO bonus contracts. For such a relationship to exist between them,
firstly, for a CEO, the avoidance of lease capitalization must have positive effects on accounting
statement items and subsequently derived accounting ratios, and secondly, these very same
financial statement items and ratios must be used as performance measures in his/her
compensation contract. The literature review above confirms not only that leases can be
accounted for opportunistically but also that performance measures commonly used in
compensation contracts are likely affected by such actions. Summa summarum, the literature
supports the existence of a plausible positive relationship between operating lease intensity and
level of CEO bonuses. Further, as we have seen, bonus contracts are fundamentally designed
to align the interests of employees with those of the company and provide incentives especially
for managers to act with the company’s best interest in mind (Petersen & Plenborg, 2008). The
only premise left necessary to establish is that compensation contract design matters in
influencing management behavior. This has been extensively documented in literature as noted
by Ittner et al. (1997): the choice of financial and non-financial measures within contracts, their
weights and mix are relevant in guiding management’s actions. The relationship between
operating lease intensity and CEO bonuses is, therefore, as follow:
Avoidance of
capitalization (i.e.
preference for
operating leases)
Improved
performance
measures (e.g.
earnings)
Positive
incremental effect
on bonuses
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This relationship is direct and easy to imagine as operating leases coupled with competent
executives can have a positive effect on accounting-based performance measures while, on the
other hand, a direct link between these measures and bonuses are stipulated in bonus contracts.
Indeed, opportunistically choosing operating leases with the intent of improving accounting-
based performance measures can increase bonuses incrementally in the right setting.
The reason for focusing on bonuses instead of other components of executive pay warrants
explanation especially, as we have seen, as they only account for a fraction of CEO total pay.
As seen above, the composition of CEO pay is multifaceted, and each component is affected
by varying drivers. There are some specific reasons why cash bonuses receive special attention
instead of other components of CEO pay in this thesis. The first one being that a clear
relationship exists between cash bonuses and accounting-based performance measures: bonuses
are mainly determined by ratios and figures derived from the financial statement. Indeed,
bonuses are more highly correlated with accounting-based performance measures than other
components of executive pay (Core et al., 2003). Also, a positive association exists between the
relative importance of bonuses as a component of total pay and the extent of earnings
management (Larcker et al., 2007). As to the directness of the relationship between
management bonuses and effects of lease capitalization, Murphy (1999) showed that earnings
are the most commonly used accounting-based measure determining the level of bonuses. Thus,
it can be expected that the relative importance of bonuses in executives’ compensation plans
bear significance over the likelihood of engaging in earnings manipulation. Also, as we have
seen, significant earnings effects have been noted as a result of operating lease capitalization.
Another reason is that other forms of compensation, such as options and restricted stock, are
more ambiguous. Even though bonuses are not the most important components of executive
bonuses, they offer a “cleaner” way of studying compensation-based incentives’ effects on
operating lease intensity (proxying the preference for operating leases) than another component
of executive total pay would (say the relationship between stock price and operating lease
intensity). A study involving options and restricted stock would most likely require
incorporation of more sophisticated methodologies such as option valuation, pay-performance
sensitivities or event studies – all of which increase complexity and variance (i.e. noise).
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Although, Murphy (1999) and Hall & Liebman (1998) show that changes in CEO wealth are
mostly explained by changes in company stock price leaving little room for other components
of compensation, Murphy (2013) speculates interestingly that from a behavioral perspective,
annual and multi-year bonuses based on accounting measures may be as important as equity-
based compensation in directing the activities of CEOs and other executives. Firstly, incentive
plans are only effective if participants know how to reach the targets and affect the payoff. How
to increase accounting income is likely better understood than how to increase company stock
price (although one could argue that they are highly interconnected). Secondly, payoffs based
on bonus contracts are paid out after year-end financials have been audited – the rewards from
bonus plans are more immediate than distant and uncertain gains in unvested equity plans.
Incentives based on short-term accounting profits are likely to increase measures taken to
maximize short-term profits - a phenomenon largely documented in financial economics
literature. As Murphy (2013) points out, the short-term nature of bonus plans incentivizes taking
measures to manipulate earnings and increase short-term profits at the expense of the long-
term. And last but not least, using cash bonuses in similar settings has been successful in earlier
research: for instance, Shalev et al. (2013) argue that earnings-based bonus plans compared to
other forms of compensation provide stronger incentives for executives to overstate goodwill
(in order to maximize accounting-based bonuses) and thus, bonuses as a component of total
pay, are more likely to encourage earnings inflation. The study found that CEOs whose
compensation rely more heavily on earnings-based bonuses are more likely to overstate
goodwill in order to maximize their bonuses.
4.2 Evidence from previous studies
Although several studies on the determinants of leases have hypothesized and treated
management compensation as a plausible determinant of accounting policy choice and finance
vs. operating lease decisions, there is no comprehensive body of literature on the topic and the
evidence so far is mixed (Morais, 2014).
The hypothesized relationship between leasing and management compensation goes back to at
least 1985. Smith and Wakeman (1985) identify management compensation as a potential
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incentive for leasing in cases where management compensation is based on accounting figures
such as return on invested capital (ROIC). The general mechanism underlying the relationship
between management compensation and operating leases is attributable to the ratio itself: with
every asset purchased or capitalized as a finance lease in the balance sheet, the growth in assets
will dilute the denominator of the ratio for invested capital and thus weaken the premises for
management compensation. Theoretically, in such a case, a manager with such an incentive
would prefer to have the asset obtained through an operating lease and have it off the balance
sheet. The authors note that a potential control for this on a contractual level is to design the
ratio of return on invested capital to include the capitalized value of the operating lease. No
empirical research testing this hypothesis is undertaken in the study and it therefore remains as
purely speculative.
El-Gazzar et al. (1986) examine factors affecting choices of managers regarding lease
accounting using “political costs” (size, effective tax rate), leverage effect, and management
compensation variables. The study focuses on U.S. companies’ financial statements prior to the
implementation of SFAS 13, adopted in 1976, which forced many companies in the U.S. to
capitalize a significant portion of their operating leases. This sample period preference allows
for data on companies’ leasing choices at a time when significantly more discretion in lease
accounting was allowed. The author’s note that the theoretical underpinning of the study is
based on prior accounting literature proposing that management influenced by bonus incentives
is more likely to undertake accounting procedures that maximize reported earnings in the
current period at the expense of future periods. Secondly, they note that the type of income used
(defined) in incentive contracts will largely determine whether or not management can increase
its compensation through lease accounting choices – something Murphy (1999) later shed light
on. The authors hypothesized that if income in incentive contracts is calculated after deducting
interest expense, for companies that are growing, operating leases will maximize incentive
income as high depreciation and interest expenses typical for finance leases are deferred to
future periods. The authors remained unsure at the time about how the choice between capital
and operating lease affects compensation of managers whose contracts specify compensation
income as earnings before interest. Thus, the study arrives at the incentive plan hypothesis as:
36
“Those firms with incentive plans based on income after interest are more likely to use the
operating approach for lease accounting. Those firms with income-based incentive plans or
incentive plans based on income before interest expense are more likely to capitalize leases.
This implies a positive correlation between the operating method and the income-based
compensation plans.”
The empirical models in the study used to test the above hypothesis all have dummy variables
for incentive compensation taking on the value of 1 for companies that have managerial
compensation contracts using after-interest income. The study reports a positive statistically
significant correlation between use of operating leases and management compensation
implying that companies with managerial incentive plans relying on performance measures
based on income after interest expense are more likely to prefer using operating leases. Again,
what is important to remember about this study is that it focuses on financial statements before
the adoption of SFAS No. 13 in 1976 - when managers could exercise significant discretion
between choosing operating or finance leases.
Duke et al. (2002) test predictions (the set of hypotheses) laid out in Smith and Wakeman’s
(1985) study on determinants of leases suggested by literature and the authors themselves. The
hypothesis of operating-lease use being more likely if management compensation is based on
return on invested capital is tested with the same measure used in El-Gazzar et al. (1986): a
dummy variable set to one if managements’ compensation is based on income after interest and
set to zero if not. Duke et al. used several models to test Smith and Wakeman’s predictions:
two ordered logit models, a multinomial logit model and OLS regression. None of the empirical
models used found any evidence for the Smith-Wakeman hypothesis of management
compensation being a determinant of operating lease usage. Interestingly, the management
compensation hypothesis was the only one tested which wasn’t supported by findings. The
authors themselves did not find this surprising; indeed, a) they noted a general continuity of
poor performance of management compensation variables in accounting choice studies, and b)
they reasoned that a multitude of other more important factors are likely to affect management
compensation. The reasoning remained on the level of speculation, however, as no supporting
literature was discussed. Also, discussion of reasons of why the management compensation
variable was not found to be statistically significant is somewhat sparse. The author suspect
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that as El-Gazzar et al. (1986) (they shared the same methodology) studied financial statement
data prior to SFAS No. 13, the relationship may have existed prior to the standard’s
implementation but perhaps not after it.
Imhoff et al. (1993) assessed whether compensation committees adjusted management
compensation for the effects of operating leases when such footnote disclosures are made in
financial statements. The effects of operating lease capitalization on compensation decisions
was studied by relating the percentage change in CEO salary and bonus (%∆COMP) to the
change in both return on assets and return on equity (∆ROA and ∆ROE). They consider CEO
compensation to be significantly related to accounting performance measures. The authors
report that effects of operating leases are not considered by compensation committees
determining executive compensation and are therefore not incorporated into executive
compensation contracts. This inference is reached because capitalization of operating leases did
not provide incremental explanatory power in determining management compensation levels.
The study is somewhat hard to interpret but it appears to suggest the following: if executive
compensation committees actively adjust compensation granted to management by the effects
operating leases potentially have on performance measures (used in compensation), then
capitalizing operating leases should result in a regression variable with incremental explanatory
power over the level of compensation. This, however, was not found to be the case implying
firstly that management compensation does not differ with high and low leasing companies and
secondly, as the authors propose, that managers are free to tinker with operating leases to
increase their compensation. Therefore, this study does not provide direct evidence per se on
whether or not such acts are actively taken by managers, but rather simply note that
‘presumably, managers are free to engage in compensation-increasing leasing behavior without
the fear that compensation committees will undo their efforts on payday’.
Lückerath-Rovers (2007) in her dissertation tests whether change in management compensation
can be explained by changes in operating lease intensity and whether a difference exist in the
level of compensation for high and low leasing companies. The study tests two hypotheses: 1)
a positive relationship is expected between increases in management compensation and
increases in operating lease intensity, and 2) a positive relationship is expected between total
management compensation and operating lease intensity. The hypotheses are tested first with a
univariate regression model with a sample consisting of Dutch listed companies. Results
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indicate a significant positive relationship between changes in management compensation
levels and operating lease intensities. Also, and more interestingly, the results show that
management compensation is significantly higher in high-leasing companies as well as the
relative amount of bonuses to base pay being higher in high-leasing companies (38 percent for
low-leasing companies and 47 percent for high-leasing companies). Although both hypotheses
are initially tested with a univariate regression model with no control variables or other
considerations, Lückerath-Rovers (2007) asserts explicitly based on the results that
management of Dutch companies succeed in increasing their compensation by high use of
operating leases. The individually tested variables are then tested in a multivariate regression
model taking into consideration all identified determinants of leases in literature. This time
however, the absolute amount of management compensation in the four regression models show
a negative relationship with operating lease intensity three times and a positive relationship
once. Thus, Lückerath-Rovers rejects both hypotheses.
The studies on management compensation as a determinant for leases reveal a few things.
Firstly, they are not many in numbers – relevant studies on the topics are somewhat scarce and
secondly, the findings seem to agree with Duke et al. (2002) on the poor performance of
management compensation variables. However, because of the lack of conclusiveness in
studies so far and the fact that many do not test the described association explicitly, more
evidence is needed. Also, as the literature review in this thesis has shown, the setting in which
avoidance of operating lease capitalization may increase CEO compensation does not
necessarily always exist presenting its own difficulties.
4.3 Hypothesis
Based on the literature review on both the effects of lease capitalization, management
compensation and management compensation as a determinant of leasing, the following
hypothesis is formed:
H0: “There is a positive association between lease intensity and level of CEO bonus
compensation.”
39
As discussed above, the hypothesis is motivated by the possibility of artificially improving
performance measures used in determining CEO bonus levels through use of operating leases.
Therefore, a positive association is expected between lease intensity and level of CEO bonus
compensation. Compared to previous studies, this hypothesis takes on similar form as in
Lückerath-Rovers (2007) by examining the overall association between these components
while being looser than hypotheses in Duke et al. (2002) and El-Gazzar et al. (1986). This
generality is useful considering that more detailed information on both company-specific
effects of lease capitalization and performance measures used in management compensation is
harder to obtain for the purposes of a broader statistical analysis. Thus, the hypothesis is formed
in order to obtain results of a more preliminary kind.
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5. Data and methods
5.1 Sample selection
As this study does not address the classical lease-or-buy decision per se, it is not interested in
companies which do not lease. The main interest is whether there is a positive link between
management compensation and use of operating leases. Sample data should therefore consist
of companies which operate in lease-intensive industries and are more likely to lease assets
compared to other industries. With this in mind, the airline industry was chosen for examination
as the choice is backed by past accounting research. For instance, Grossman & Grossman
(2010) and Imhoff et al. (1993) noted airlines as one of the industries most affected by lease
capitalization. Imhoff et al. (1991) find that airlines and groceries are two of the seven industries
with large amounts of operating leases. According to Gavazza (2010), the commercial airline
market is ideal for research on leasing issues due to more than half of all commercial airlines
being leased. At the time of the study (2010), within the entire population of commercial
aircrafts, roughly one third of were under operating leases and one sixth under finance leases.
Also, a focus on a single industry instead of a cross-sectional analysis will mitigate effects
industry specific properties of companies such as differences in leverage etc.
The sample for the empirical part of the study was obtained from Compustat Capital IQ
Fundamentals Annual database. Relevant data was extracted using Standard Industrial
Classification (SIC) codes related to transportation by air services SIC major group 45 (4500 –
4599). This group consists of establishments providing services primarily involved in
transportation by air, operating airports and flying fields, and furnishing terminal services.
Focusing on companies providing transportation-by-air services, data was extracted from the
database for individual SIC codes 4512, 4513 and 4522. Thus, the data contains companies
providing both scheduled and non-scheduled air transportation as well as air courier services.
This dataset contained financial statement information for the sample companies. The second
dataset contains executive compensation data extracted from Compustat Execucomp database.
The nature of this database determines the sample period: internally comparable data available
from Execucomp is available from 2006 onwards. Data prior to 2006 has been recorded under
a different regulatory framework (standard prior to the current FAS 123: Accounting for Stock
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Based Compensation) than subsequent data. For this reason, the sample initially covers
financial years 2006 to 2019 but is narrowed down to 2008-2018 due to variable design (lagged
variables) discussed below.
The combining of the two datasets renders observations from either dataset obsolete if the
matching information is not found in the other. The final sample size for the combined dataset
is thus 𝑁 = 155.
5.2 Methods
5.2.1 Empirical model
The hypothesis is tested using the following OLS regression models. Two models are used in
order to test two different proxies for management bonuses and control for some potential
pitfalls explained below.
  (1) 𝐿𝐸𝐴𝑆𝐸𝐼𝑁𝑇 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐵𝑂𝑁𝑈𝑆 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽3𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸 + 𝛽4𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻+ 𝛽5𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸 + 𝜀
  (2) 𝐿𝐸𝐴𝑆𝐸𝐼𝑁𝑇 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷_𝐵𝑂𝑁𝑈𝑆 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸 + 𝛽3𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸 + 𝛽4𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻+ 𝛽5𝑃𝐸𝑅𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑀𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸 + 𝜀
In which,
LEASEINT =
capitalized operating lease asset
PP&E+ capitalized operating lease asset
BONUS =
𝐿𝑎𝑔𝑔𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑤𝑜−𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑎𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠𝑒𝑠
𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑎𝑦
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D_BONUS = dummy variable taking on the value of 1 if bonuses are paid two years
sequentially
SIZE = the natural logarithm of sales
LEVERAGE = ratio of debt to equity (D/E)
GROWTH = no-dividend dummy taking on the value of 1 when cash dividend is paid
during the financial year
PERFORMANCE =
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴 + 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
5.2.2 Dependent variable
The dependent variable in the empirical model is LEASEINT, which captures a company’s
operating lease intensity referring to the proportional amount of the capitalized (operating) lease
asset over the totality of revenue generating property, plant and equipment (including all
finance leases within this group).
The variable captures the relative amount of a company’s revenue generating assets that are not
found as fixed assets on the balance sheet but are rather accounted for as operating leases and
expensed in the income statement. A relative rather than absolute variable removes any direct
effects of company size (in balance sheet terms), although it obviously does not control for the
possibility that company size may be an explanatory factor in the eagerness of a company to
increase leasing intensity.
Compustat database incorporates operating lease expenditure figures as presented in the notes
to companies’ financial statements: the minimum rental commitments (MRC) due in first,
second, third, fourth, and fifth years from the balance sheet date under all existing
noncancelable leases (Compustat #96, #164-167). The cumulative total of all future rental
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commitments after year five (TA, referring to thereafter portion) are also captured separately
(Compustat #95).
As these cash flows are undiscounted and as such theoretically incomparable with one another,
the figures are via capitalization discounted for additivity in order to generate an estimate of
the lease asset and liability. There are generally two classes of methods used in capitalizing
operating leases: present value methods and multiple methods (Lückerath-Rovers, 2007).
Multiple methods are based on multiplying next year’s annual operating lease payment with a
constant factor (such as 8 or 6) and are as such more akin to a heuristic rather than a theoretically
sound method backed by economic literature. The advantage of using such a heuristic lies in its
simplicity and easy applicability while its weakness in disregarding fundamentals (interest
rates, total and remaining life of lease assets). More sophisticated multiple methods aim to
correct these shortcomings by taking these fundamentals into account on some level while
retaining applicability. Nevertheless, none reach the rigor of present value methods which make
up the second class of capitalization methods.
Along the present value method, we arrive at the capitalized operating lease liability by
discounting future lease obligations (minimum rental commitments):
i) 𝑃𝑉𝑂𝐿 = 𝑀𝑅𝐶1(1+𝑟) + 𝑀𝑅𝐶2(1+𝑟)2 + 𝑀𝑅𝐶3(1+𝑟)3 + 𝑀𝑅𝐶4(1+𝑟)4 + 𝑀𝑅𝐶5(1+𝑟)5 + 𝑇𝐴(1+𝑟)6,
where
𝑃𝑉𝑂𝐿 = 𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑜𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛,
𝑀𝑅𝐶𝑡 = 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑎𝑡 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑡,
𝑇𝐴 = 𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒𝑠
𝑟 = 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒.
The capitalized lease liability (PVOL) used to calculate lease intensities of sample companies
in this study is constructed as per Imhoff et al. (1991). As minimum rental commitments for
years 1-5 in the future are disclosed explicitly, discounting them is simple and straightforward
– only the relevant discount (interest) rate is required. Commitments after 5 years (TA),
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however, also depend on assumptions regarding the distribution and duration of lease payments
making up the disclosed lump sum. Therefore, the discounting of present value of operating
leases relies on four critical assumptions:
1) The interest rate used in discounting cash flows,
2) Remaining life of lease assets and obligations,
3) As financial statements present all operating lease cash flows after five years as a lump
sum, a pattern of these cash flows along the estimated duration, and
4) All cash flows are assumed to occur at year-end (not throughout the year).
By discounting operating lease cash flows we will arrive at their present values - in order to do
this, we need a generalized discount rate. Lückerath-Rovers (2007) notes in her study that
generally a 10 percent discount rate has been applied in studies attempting to constructively
capitalize operating lease cash flows – these studies include Imhoff et al. (1991), Imhoff et al.
(1997), Beattie et al. (1998) and Ely (1995). Goodacre (2003) used 8.5 percent when studying
the effects of capitalization of operating leases for UK retail sector. Imhoff et al. (1991) argue
that the theoretically correct interest rate for capitalization is the weighted average of the
historical borrowing rates of the entity at the times of inception of operating leases. These are,
however, not known and therefore can’t be used. The study therefore adopts the average
historical secured long-term debt as a proxy (the study only looks at a single company). In their
1997 study, Imhoff et al. argue that the implicit interest rate in companies’ financial statements
(either explicit or implicit but calculable) should be the basis for discounting. Beattie et al.
(1998) use the three-month London deposit rate for their whole sample while Ely (1995) sees
the footnotes in the sample companies’ financial statements regarding long-term debt
representative of a suitable discount rate. Further, Beattie et al. (1998) perform a sensitivity test
on their assumption of a uniform 10 percent interest rate by introducing variance of ±2 percent
and noted “very little change” in the results (profitability ratios and gearing). As these ratios
use the same post-capitalization balance sheet figures as the LEASEINT -variable, it can be
expected that a similar “error” in the applied sample-wide uniform interest rate should not
deteriorate the quality of the this study.
It is worth pointing out that interest rates have declined significantly since the abovementioned
studies were published. This is also briefly pointed out in a footnote by Lückerath-Rovers
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(2007) stating a 10 percent discount rate as inappropriate in an environment of low interest
rates. The danger of using a discount rate close to 10 percent lies in producing too conservative
present values ultimately leading to possibly biased data in the model. If a company is
incentivized towards operating leases for the purposes of avoiding impacts of capitalization on
financial statement items, it is only logical that the larger the present value of the lease, the
higher the incentive not to capitalize. By extension, estimating the present values of lease
payments too conservatively may partially obscure the hypothetical relationship between
operating lease intensity and executive compensation. Therefore, a uniform 4 percent interest
rate is used in estimating the capitalized lease asset and liability for the whole sample; this way,
the low interest rate environment of the past decade is incorporated into analysis.
Financial statements do not generally disclose information on the total or remaining life of
operating leases both of which are required in order to arrive at the PVOL and PVA (the present
value of lease asset). In order to estimate the total lease life, this study uses the method adopted
in Imhoff et al. (1997) where the minimum rental commitment beyond year five (TA) is divided
by the 𝑀𝑅𝐶5 resulting in an approximation of how many years the payments will continue at
the rate of the fifth year’s payment. A constant of five is then added to this figure to add the
effect of the first five years of lease life.  The estimate is rounded up to the next whole year.
ii) 𝐿𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑙𝑖𝑓𝑒 (𝑇𝐿) = 5 + 𝑇𝐴
𝑀𝑅𝐶5
, 𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑 𝑡𝑜 𝑡ℎ𝑒 𝑛𝑒𝑥𝑡 𝑓𝑢𝑙𝑙 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟
Unlike Imhoff et al., however, this study follows Jennings & Marques (2013) in which the
output of the above formula is not regarded as the remaining life of the lease but rather the total
life. This assumption is discussed in more depth below.
This principle is simple and effective albeit somewhat ambiguous as noted by the authors of
the method. For the purposes of discounting these minimum rental commitments, a pattern of
payments across the remaining life of the lease obligation must also be determined (division of
the lease payments beyond five years). It is assumed that the annual payments remain equal
throughout the remaining life of the lease obligation – an assumption also present in Imhoff et
al. (1991, 1997).
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iii) 𝑀𝑅𝐶𝑡>5 = 𝑇𝐴𝑇𝐿 − 5,
where
𝑀𝑅𝐶𝑡>5 = 𝑎𝑛𝑛𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑏𝑒𝑦𝑜𝑛𝑑 𝑡 = 5
With these assumptions and premises in place, the disclosed operating lease payments for each
company can be discounted into a theoretically grounded estimate of capitalized operating lease
liability, PVOL. Discounting of lease payments through 1-5 is straightforward. Payments after
𝑡 + 5, however, require assuming the equal annual payment to take place from 𝑡 = 1,
calculating the present value of equal payments for the whole 𝑇𝐿 and subtracting from it the
present value of payments through years 1-5. Expressed formally, this takes the form of
iv) 𝑃𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡>5 = 𝑀𝑅𝐶𝑡>5 ∗ ൭1−ቀ 11+𝑟ቁ𝑇𝐿𝑟 − 1−ቀ 11+𝑟ቁ5𝑟 ൱
where
𝑃𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑡>5 = 𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒 𝑜𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑔𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝑓𝑖𝑣𝑒 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠
Summing up the discounted lease payments through years 1 to 5 and the present value of lease
payments after year 5 yields us with the total present value of lease obligations i.e. the
capitalized lease liability, PVOL. This estimate represents the portion of liability unrecorded in
the balance sheet compared to a situation in which all leases are required by regulation to be
accounted as finance leases.
From the PVOL we are able to estimate the unrecorded capitalized lease asset (PVA), which
the empirical model’s dependent variable LEASEINT incorporates both in its nominator and
denominator. The unrecorded lease asset has to be estimated from the capitalized lease liability
separately as they do not equal each other throughout the life of a lease. The reason for this is
that the lease asset is depreciated using a suitable method, e.g. straight-line depreciation, while
the lease liability is reduced through interest payment and repayment of principal. As the
principal is the largest in the start of the lease life, so are the interest payments. The proportion
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of the principal repayment of the total lease payment (in accounting, that is) is smallest in the
start of the lease, but gradually grows as the interest-portion of the payment declines with time.
This leads to the following relationship between the PVA and PVOL through time illustrated
in Figure 4 – the magnitude of this relationship depends on the interest rate used as well as the
following assumptions. This mechanism of accounting leads to the fact that the unrecorded
lease liability is always equal or larger than the unrecorded lease asset.
Figure 4. The relationship between the (unrecorded) lease asset and liability (Imhoff 1991,
figure 1)
In order to estimate the PVA from PVOL, a set of assumptions need to be made (Imhoff et al.,
1991).
1)  Straight-line depreciation is used for all lease assets,
2) The unrecorded lease asset and liability at 𝑡 = 0 equal a 100 percent of the present value
of the future lease payments,
3) The unrecorded lease asset and liability are both zero in value after the last lease
payment has been made for each lease (end of useful life).
The assumptions are not unrealistic per se and as Lückerath-Rovers (2007) notes concerning
Imhoff et al. (1991), the assumptions are comparable with 100 percent debt financing of an
Present value
of operating lease
at inception
Termination of lease/end
of asset's useful life
PVOL PVA
t = 0
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asset based on annuities and a related depreciation of the mentioned asset with the straight-line
method.
Under these assumptions an asset-to-liability ratio (ALR) can be calculated (also called asset
proportion in some studies) by establishing a factor with which the unrecorded lease liability
is multiplied to achieve the unrecorded lease asset. Again, the methodology is as in Imhoff et
al. (1991, 1997) – note, however, that formula (v) is presented as in Jennings & Marques (2013)
for the virtue of its clarity. The ALR-factor operates as follows
v) 𝑃𝑉𝐴 = 𝐴𝐿𝑅 ∗ 𝑃𝑉𝑂𝐿
of which
vi) 𝐴𝐿𝑅 = 1−(1+𝑟)−𝑁ቀ𝑅𝐿𝑇𝐿ቁ𝑟1−(1+𝑟)−𝑅𝐿
𝑟
Formula (vi) represents the ALR factor for converting PVOL into PVA. The nominator
represents the asset value equal to a one-dollar annuity for the total life (TL) times the ratio of
the remaining years (RL) to the total life of the lease (TL). The denominator represents the
liability value equal to the present value of a one-dollar annuity for the remaining years of the
lease.
Financial statements do not disclose the total or remaining lives of leases nor do they generally
inform the reader on the average maturity of the lease portfolio. This presents further difficulty
as the magnitude of the ALR-factor for a single lease, and thus the unrecorded lease asset,
depends on which point in time of its life the lease is presently in. As Figure 4 shows, under the
previously stated assumptions, the ALR-factor is smallest in the mid-point of its life and largest
either in the start of or when approaching the end of its useful life. Imhoff et al. used a 70
percent factor in 1991 and a 75 percent factor in 1997 as a general rule on thumb. Their 1991
study argues that most of the time the ratio of lease asset to lease liability is between 60 to 80
percent and therefore using 70 percent as a general factor is not unreasonable. Note that these
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percentages are influenced by high discount rates in the study compared to present standards.
This study adopts the method used in Jennings & Marques (2013); the total life of the lease is
assumed to match the years for which cash flows are expected (i.e. formula (ii) does not
represent the remaining life as in Imhoff et al. (1997) but rather the total life). The remaining
life on the other hand is assumed to be 𝑇𝐿/2 implying that the average lease is in the midpoint
of its expected useful life.
Following this methodology, the proportional amount of the capitalized (operating) lease asset
over the totality of revenue generating fixed assets (including all finance leases) for a given
company is calculated for each financial year – i.e. the proxy for operating lease intensity.
Below, in Figure 5, the yearly average lease intensity for all companies through the sample
period is shown.
Figure 5.  Average yearly lease intensity of sample companies through the sample period
5.2.3 Main explanatory variable
In order to test the hypothesis, two proxies for management bonuses are constructed and tested
separately against the dependent variable: BONUS and D_BONUS. To mitigate problems
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caused by possible multicollinearity of a bonus proxy in relation to control variables such as
profitability (accounting-based bonuses are driven by performance such as earnings etc.), as
per Shalev et al. (2013), BONUS is constructed as a two-year lagged average of the ratio
between CEO’s bonus over total pay. Note that this design causes changes to the period for
which observations are found as described in 5.1 Sample selection. As such, this variable
measures the relative importance of cash bonus in a CEO’s total pay package. As Lückerath-
Rovers (2007) found, operating lease intensities were found to be higher for companies with
CEOs receiving higher levels of bonuses in relation to total compensation. Figure 6 below
shows the average level of BONUS over time. The plotted line takes on a u-shape; bonuses have
peaked both in 2009 and 2018 whereas the years in between show roughly a decline until 2012
and a rise back to previous levels beginning in 2015. D_BONUS on the other hand is simply a
dummy variable taking on the value of 1 if a bonus is paid both during the financial year for
which lease intensities are calculated and the previous financial year. Further, the lag for this
variable is also relaxed to one year (although it is also qualitatively different from the lag
associated with BONUS). This variable is constructed as a dummy in order to relax the
assumption of linearity imposed by the model between operating lease intensity and bonuses
(as with BONUS) and to simply observe whether a categorical relationship between LEASEINT
and D_BONUS is present. Thus, the coefficient for D_BONUS simply picks up the average
change in lease intensity if management bonuses are paid during the year.
Figure 6.  Average ratio of bonuses over total compensation through the sample period
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5.2.4 Control variables
LEVERAGE was identified by most of the abovementioned lease capitalization studies as the
variable which was the most affected by lease capitalization (highest impact on financial ratios).
Indeed, literature has shown that the off-balance sheet financing aspect of operating leases is
one of the fundamental reasons for managers to choose not to capitalize operating leases, i.e. to
avoid presenting debt on the balance sheet (Ang & Petersen, 1981) or breaking leverage-based
covenants (EL-Gazzar et al., 1986; Duke, 2002). This implies that the greater the ratio of debt
to equity for a given company, the more likely it is to prefer operating leases over finance leases.
The variable is expected to exhibit a positive relationship between leverage (D/E) and operating
lease intensity.
SIZE is shown by Lückerath-Rovers (2007) to have at best been an ambiguous determinant of
leasing in literature and valid arguments have been made for both a positive and negative
relationship between size and operating lease intensity. The suggested reasons vary from
arguing for a negative relationship based on larger companies’ ability to redeploy assets
internally (less need to avoid long-term commitments – the flexibility argument) to the positive
relationship by political cost and financial constraint theory in which the former states that
larger companies are more watched and have more pressure to report better financials and the
latter arguing that larger companies have better access to financial markets (allowing to choose
financial contracts that are in their best interest). Based on empirical findings, however, within
the airline context Gavazza (2010) finds that, measured by carrier fleet size, smaller carriers are
more likely to lease in accordance with the flexibility argument. To avoid the potential
endogeneity of using total assets as the variable for size (as they are affected by lease intensity),
the natural logarithm of sales is chosen. SIZE is expected to have a negative relationship with
lease intensity as smaller airlines are expected to finance a larger portion of their fleet through
operating leases.
GROWTH (proxy for the investment opportunity set) has been a traditional theoretical
explanatory variable for leasing intensity. Lückerath-Rovers (2007) identifies that generally a
positive relationship between growth (investment opportunity) and leasing has been expected:
companies that have been growing in the past and face more uncertainty are inclined to use
financing such as leasing which allows for more flexibility than owning assets does. This
implies that high-leasing companies are expected to have grown more in the past than low-
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leasing companies as well as the notion that high-leasing companies are expected to grow more
in the future. Also, research on management compensation has in general found that firms with
greater growth opportunities (and size – a note towards the previous control variable) require
more talent and highly paid managers (Conyon, 2011). Sharpe & Nguyen (1995) use a no-
dividend dummy variable as a proxy to identify growth companies (they are less likely to pay
out dividends when facing a large set of investment opportunities). Also, Lückerath-Rovers
(2007) points out that no-dividend has been one of the few statistically significant variables
proxying growth in literature. Based on the above, this variable (taking a value of 1 when
dividend is paid) is expected to have a negative relationship with operating lease intensity.
PERFORMANCE is selected as a control variable due to its popularity in literature – there are
two ways profitability is expected to have an effect on operating lease intensity (Lückerath-
Rovers, 2007). First, it is expected that lower levels of earnings (low profitability) may cause
managers to prefer operating leases over finance leases due to the enhancing effect non-
capitalization of leases has on earnings. Second, firms with low profitability may face higher
external financing costs because they are closer to exhausting their debt capacity and have to
rely on leasing. Thus, both hypothesize a negative relationship between (operating) lease
intensity and profitability. The proxy for profitability on the other hand is a more challenging
matter to address. It could be argued that the most straightforward way to measure profitability
is to choose earnings as a proxy. In this case, however, earnings (NI) is influenced, as shown
above, by the choice of financing through operating leases and, therefore, the relationship
between NI and lease intensity is endogenous. Also, measures like ROA which have total assets
or other balance sheet items in their denominator, are also affected by non-capitalization of
operating leases, and again, are by nature endogenous in relation to leasing intensity. To get
around this matter, as proxy for profitability (performance), the ratio of operating income to
sales is chosen as per Sharpe & Nguyen (1995) (their definition of cash flow). In order to avoid
creating a measure influenced by either the choice between leasing and buying, or by lease-
intensity itself (amount of operating lease rent expenses in EBITDA), operating income is
defined as EBITDA with rent expenses added back divided by total sales. As this measure does
not take into consideration any effects of capitalization (or interest expenses, depreciation, rent
expenses for that matter), it should offer a more robust way to measure profitability. For
instance, the temporal effects of the front-loading are not included in this proxy – this way the
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potential endogeneity is mitigated. On the same note, the control variable LEVERAGE should,
on the other hand, proxy the level of financial cost effecting profitability as companies with
higher debt are expected to suffer higher interest expenses.
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6. Results and findings
This chapter discusses the results and findings of the empirical analysis. First the descriptive
statistics for the sample are presented while the second part focuses on the regression results
for the empirical model. Thirdly, outliers are discussed and multicollinearity test results
presented.
6.1 Descriptive statistics
Table 1 below shows the sample’s descriptive statistics excluding dummy variables D_BONUS
and GROWTH.
Table 1
Variable LEASEINT BONUS SIZE LEVERAGE PERFORMANCE
Mean 0.25 0.09 8.47 4.89 0.23
Median 0.24 0.00 8.10 2.19 0.23
St. Dev. 0.16 0.17 1.52 9.01 0.07
Minimum 0.00 0.00 5.40 0.64 0.00
Maximum 0.70 0.83 11.15 77.23 0.40
Table 2 shows the mean, median, standard deviation, minimum and maximum value for all
observations and variables. Each of the figures should be interpreted with their nature in mind.
The variables LEASEINT, BONUS, LEVERAGE and PERFORMANCE are relative figures and
express an abstract ratio, whereas SIZE is the natural logarithm of sales.
For LEASEINT the distance between the median and mean is small indicating little but some
skewness with the maximum value of 0.70 confirming the observation. The bulk of
observations for this variable fall between 0.2 – 0.6 (83 percent). Thus, within listed U.S.
airlines, an average of 25 percent of the means of production through the years 2008 to 2018
have been financed by use of operating leases. The standard deviation shows that there is
substantial variation in lease intensities in this cross-sectional sample. The median for BONUS
exhibits the fact that most observations in the sample show no paid bonuses (63 percent) and
therefore take on the value of zero. 61 observations of 155 show the lagged two-year average
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bonuses larger than zero with 24 (15 percent) of these in the range of larger than zero and less
or equal to 10 percent of total compensation, 31 (20 percent) in the range of larger than 10 and
less or equal to 50 percent of total compensation. Only six observations exhibit ratios larger
than this. The maximum value and mean indicate (with the median value in mind) that
observations for this variable are strongly positively skewed – thus, the median value and
standard deviation tell little of the variable’s distribution alone. The mean and median values
for SIZE are relatively close to each other with a fairly small standard deviation for
observations. The minimum and maximum values exhibit no large single deviations. For
LEVERAGE, the mean observation is 2.2 while the median 4.9 exhibiting some skewness. The
standard deviation for the variable is fairly large (9.01). 144 out of 155 observations fall within
the range of 0-10 percent (91 percent) and the rest are values larger than 10 – this is to be
expected as balance sheet debt 10 times or more the amount of shareholder’s equity is
undesirable for companies for reasons of increased fragility to volatility both in the operating
and financial domains. The maximum shows that a small number of observations take on a
large value – these are cases in which shareholders equity is relatively close to zero inflating
the ratio. 116 out of 155 (75 percent) observations fall within the range of 0-4 times debt to
equity. PERFORMANCE exhibits the least skewness and appears to be closest to a normal
distribution out of all the variables: the mean and median are both 0.23 with a standard deviation
of 0.07 and observations are evenly distributed around the median. Observations for
PERFORMANCE involve no outliers. This can be expected due to the nature of the variable;
operating profit with rent expenses added back is certain to operate within a certain range due
to economic realities. Observations for dummy variables D_BONUS and GROWTH, not
addressed in the above table, are as follows: for GROWTH, 58 percent of the time this dummy
variable takes on a value of 1 (indicating that cash dividends larger than zero were paid by a
sample company in a given financial year), while for D_BONUS, 20 percent of the observations
took on the value of 1 indicating payment of cash bonuses for two years in a row.
6.2 Regression results
Two multivariate regression models were used to predict the level of operating lease intensity
within the sample. The total sample consisted of 155 observations between the years 2008 -
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2018. In model (1), the main variable of interest is a two-year lagged average of bonuses over
CEO total compensation, and in model (2), a dummy bonus variable is used which takes on the
value of 1 if bonuses were paid out during both the financial year (for which lease intensities
were estimated) and the year previous to that. Control variables include proxies for company
size, leverage, growth and performance. Overall, model (1) was found to have statistically
significant explanatory power: with five variables and 149 degrees of freedom, 𝐹 = 6.54,𝑝 <0.000. The adjusted 𝑅2 for the model was 0.1524 indicating that the model is able to explain
roughly 15 percent of variation in operating lease intensity. Results for model (1) are presented
below in Table 2.
Table 2
Variable Predicted Coefficients t-stat P-value Significance
Intercept 0.30 2.77 0.01 ***
BONUS + -0.18 -2.24 0.03 **
SIZE - 0.01 0.54 0.59
LEVERAGE + 0.00 1.37 0.17
GROWTH - 0.05 1.90 0.06 *
PERFORMANCE - -0.48 -2.45 0.02 **
*** Significant at 1%
** Significant at 5%
* Significant at 10%
Results were very similar for model (2). With five variables and 149 degrees of freedom, 𝐹 =6.52,𝑝 < 0.000. Adjusted 𝑅2 was also very close to model (1) with 0.1521. Results for model
(2) are presented below in Table 3.
 In model (1), out of all the variables, two are statistically significant at the 5 percent level:
BONUS and PERFORMANCE. GROWTH is statistically significant at the 10 percent level with
𝑝 = 0.06. For LEVERAGE and SIZE however, the p-values are 0.17 and 0.89 respectively
indicating that changes in these variables have weaker correlations with the dependent variable.
For these two variables, the signal-to-noise ratio is interpreted as too large for valid positive
interpretations to be made – therefore, contrary to predictions based on literature, within the
sample companies and sample period, company size and capital structure as proxied by the
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variables SIZE and LEVERAGE, do not appear to explain airline’s operating lease intensity.
Model two shows similar results with one difference: in this model, GROWTH is statistically
significant at the 5 percent level (compared to the 10 percent level as with the first model). SIZE
and LEVERAGE, however, remain statistically insignificant.
Table 3
Variable Predicted Coefficients t- stat P-value Significance
Intercept 0.25 2.45 0.02 **
D_BONUS + -0.07 -2.23 0.03 **
SIZE - 0.01 1.15 0.25
LEVERAGE + 0.00 1.15 0.25
GROWTH - 0.05 2.08 0.04 **
PERFORMANCE - -0.44 -2.29 0.02 **
*** Significant at 1%
** Significant at 5%
* Significant at 10%
In both models, the control variable PERFORMANCE has a coefficient in line with its predicted
direction consistent with literature on determinants of leases. Within the sample companies,
low financial performance (high performance) indicates higher (lower) operating lease
intensity. Both models predict the percentage point change in companies’ operating lease
intensity given a one percentage point change in the company’s financial performance. For
model (1), the quantitative relationship in the sample between PERFORMANCE and
LEASEINT is -0.48 indicating that a one percentage point increase in 𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝐷𝐴 𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑠
𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠
results in 0.48 percentage point decrease in operating lease intensity. For model (2), the same
interpretation applies but with a slightly weaker relationship (a decrease of 0.44 percentage
points). Airlines’ operating lease intensities appear to be most sensitive to changes in this
variable compared to other specified model variables. In both models, the variable GROWTH
has a positive coefficient unlike what was predicted based on literature. This is somewhat of a
surprise; GROWTH was expected to have a negative relationship with operating lease intensity
as growing companies have an increased need for flexibility in their operations (implying
preference for operating leases), and paying dividends implies low growth (low investment
opportunities). However, within the sample companies, the relationship between GROWTH and
LEASEINT is 0.05 implying that paying out cash dividends increases the average operating
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lease intensity by 0.05 percentage points – a relationship of the opposite direction than
predicted. It is clear that this variable has little, although statistically significant, explanatory
power over operating lease intensity.
The variables of interest in this study are BONUS in model (1) (measuring a two-year lagged
average of bonus over total pay of CEOs) and D_BONUS in model (2) (a dummy variable
indicating payment of cash bonuses two years in a row). Inconsistent with H0, the coefficients
on bonus variables are significantly negative. This implies that as the proportion of bonus
compensation increases, the level of lease intensity decreases. Findings are statistically
significant in both models at the five percent level. The coefficient for BONUS (model (1)
indicates that a one percentage point increase in the ratio of bonuses over CEO total pay results
in a decrease of 0.18 percent in lease intensity. In the case of D_BONUS model (2), the strength
of the relationship (in terms of effects) is less notable: if bonuses are paid both in the year of
observation 𝑡𝑖 and the previous year 𝑡𝑖−1, then on average, operating lease intensities are 0.07
percentage points lower. Therefore, within the airline industry, higher operating lease
intensities are associated with lower bonuses for CEOs.
6.3 Outliers and multicollinearity
Trustworthiness of the model is addressed in two ways: firstly, non-informational outliers were
deleted and secondly, a VIF analysis is conducted to evaluate possible multicollinearity.
Outliers were deleted from the sample if they represented very large single yearly observations.
Two observations were deleted for the variable LEVERAGE as the fall of shareholder’s equity
to close to zero (single yearly observations) for two companies caused D/E ratios on two
occasions to grow with a factor of 100 times compared to the rest of the observations for the
same company. This was warranted as such a number is not particularly descriptive of reality
but is rather a consequence of the nature of the variable (a ratio) and increases bias in the model.
VIF (variance inflation factor) is a method of quantifying the severity of multicollinearity in an
OLS regression by calculation of an index measuring how much the variation of a regression
coefficient is increased by correlations between variables, and thus, leading to model instability.
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Essentially, each independent variable is regressed against other independent variables to see
how much of the variation of variable 𝑋1𝑖 is explained by 𝑋2𝑖, 𝑋3𝑖 … 𝑋𝑝𝑖 (expressed by the
obtained 𝑅2’s for each regression) and inflated by the formula
1
1−𝑅𝑖
2. The results can be
interpreted by a rule-of-thumb method: if the resulting variance inflation factor for each
independent variable is below 5, no severe multicollinearity is present. Another measure of
multicollinearity is Tolerance which is simply the reciprocal of VIF. Tables 4 below present
both the VIFs and Tolerances for the independent variables of model (1) and model (2)
respectively.
The calculated VIFs for both models are low indicating little presence of multicollinearity
between explanatory variables. Based on these tests which show hardly any linear relationship
between independent variables in model (1) and model (2), both empirical models appear stable
in this respect. Inferences made based on these results are not jeopardized by multicollinearity.
Table 4
Model (1) Model (2)
Independent variable Tolerance VIF Tolerance VIF
BONUS 0.81 1.23 n/a n/a
D_BONUS n/a n/a 0.95 1.06
SIZE 0.65 1.54 0.75 1.34
LEVERAGE 0.85 1.18 0.84 1.19
GROWTH 0.89 1.12 0.89 1.12
PERFORMANCE 0.83 1.21 0.84 1.20
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7. Discussion
Based on the results of the empirical model, the hypothesis is rejected. A positive association
was expected between high levels of operating lease intensities and CEO bonuses relative to
total compensation implying that operating leases have been used by airline CEOs to
opportunistically increase their compensation. The relationship between the variables BONUS
and D_BONUS turned out to be of the opposite direction expected and, surprisingly, with this
negative association in mind, the results show that these bonus variables have some explanatory
power when compared to the best performing (theoretically grounded) control variable of the
models (with statistical significance). The CEOs of airlines with higher operating lease
intensities had a) on average lower ratios of bonuses to total compensation as per model (1) and
b) had more often not been paid cash bonuses in both the year of the observation and the year
before that than companies with lower levels of operating lease intensities as per model (2).
The models showed overall little explanatory power and many of the selected control variables
fared worse than expected. In hindsight, the overall performance of lease-determinant variables
as documented by Lückerath-Rovers (2007) appear to be rather mixed which appears to explain
this to some extent. Many determinants which fared well in some studies failed to show
statistical significance in others. Indeed, based on this, the performance of theoretical
determinants of operating leases do not appear to have performed very well in research.
The theoretical framework, empirical model, and results raise some interesting thoughts and
questions when reflected against theories and findings by previous studies. Most notably, what
explains the negative association between both BONUS and D_BONUS with operating-leases
intensity? Is this a case of spurious correlation or do the results bare some meaning? The most
tempting intuitive explanation might be related to company financial performance: if less
profitable companies use more operating leases, it is logical that bonuses may be smaller. Such
an interpretation is backed by the theoretical relationship between effects of operating lease
capitalization and performance measures used in compensation contracts: i.e. when net income
(earnings) is used to measure performance, bonuses are paid (to some extent) based on earnings,
and if this measure turns out low for the financial year, one can intuitively expect low bonus
payout. However, the control variable PERFORMANCE should in theory adjust for the effects
of financial performance preventing it from confounding the main variables of interest, BONUS
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and D_BONUS. Therefore, this explanation is insufficient when considering the design of the
empirical model. Also, interestingly, no multicollinearity was detected between
PERFORMANCE and BONUS implying that they are not driven by the same mechanisms
supporting this inference.
If this is the case, and the model is specified as intended (proxies etc.), it remains an open
question as of why such a negative relationship exists; the results suggest that management
bonuses may serve as inhibiting factor of operating lease usage. Little logical explanation for
this can be found apart from a study by Devos & Li (2016), which however appears not to be
peer-reviewed (it has not been published in any academic journal), claims to find a negative
association between risk-taking incentives and firms’ operating-lease intensity driven by the
real option embedded in operating leases allowing for hedging of firms’ asset risk (e.g. the risk
of owning an obsolete asset). The article argues that 1) real leases (i.e. operating leases) in
which the lessor carries such risk while receiving rental payments are comparable to a real
option, and 2) because incentive compensation has a substantial influence on CEOs hedging
activities while greater risk-taking incentives discourage hedging, a negative relationship is
expected between operating-lease intensity and management compensation. This hypothesis is
confirmed by the study and reported as robust. However, no other studies with any take on the
matter apart from this were identified.
It might be suspected, based on the literature review, that the design of the variable BONUS
could explain the negative relationship between operating lease intensities and
𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑏𝑜𝑛𝑢𝑠
𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑡𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
 as it was noted that the total level of CEO compensation has increased
dramatically in the U.S. during the past 20 years. Indeed, if inflation adjusted absolute levels of
bonuses have remained stagnant over this timeline while total compensation has increased as a
result of the rise of equity-based compensation, then the denominator of BONUS has grown
causing the ratio to decrease. However, the coefficient of D_BONUS, which does not take in
absolute levels of CEO total compensation, is also negative. As such, the growth of CEO equity-
based compensation and its relation to the design of BONUS is not a plausible explanation.
Other considerations of causes are far more speculative. For instance, one reason for a negative
association between operating-lease intensity and the bonus variables may be that management
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bonuses are not paid linearly in relation to improvements in whatever performance measure
they may be based on, but rather, they operate within a set of thresholds as noted by Murphy
(2013). In the case of most bonuses, there exists a threshold related to a performance measure
after which a minimum bonus amount is paid, if a company is making a loss (or generally scores
lower on performance measures than expected) these thresholds may not be breached. In such
cases, speculatively, when little or no bonuses are paid, the bonus variable may exhibit a
negative relationship to the average operating-lease intensities even as profitability is controlled
for.
Other possibilities are less clear: for instance, whether temporal effects of lease capitalization
and the fact that operating-lease intensities have been steadily declining with airlines in the
sample period have an effect on the empirical results. Indeed, we have seen with lease
capitalization studies that lease capitalization is a double-edged sword with respect to its
temporal effects. In the initial years of leases, capitalization will decrease net income (i.e.
recording operating leases will increase income in comparison) as the sum of depreciation and
interest exceed the rent expense associated with operating leases. For later years of the assets’
useful life, this effect will reverse, and capitalized leases will impact NI positively (compared
to the same leases being accounted for as operating leases). Duke (2009) states it eloquently:
firms need to lease assets regularly to keep the average lease life below the point in which net
income is negatively affected. Thus, the general effects of lease capitalization on sample
companies’ average income depends heavily on whether the maturity of the lease portfolio is
increasing or decreasing. This would imply that were earnings in the center of bonus schemes,
on average, a growing portfolio of operating leases would be needed to sustain high bonuses.
This does not seem to be the case with airlines: as Figure 5 shows, the average operating lease
intensity has fallen dramatically from 40 percent in 2006 to about 12 percent in 2018. Basically,
less and less of revenue generating assets appear to have been financed by operating leases. If
CEOs have been adjusting operating lease intensities downwards in anticipation of, for
instance, a new lease accounting standard, then it is also appropriate to assume that any attempts
to maximize compensation with such a mechanism have also been discarded.
Regarding control variables in the model and their poor performance, it would be interesting to
learn whether this is due to poor proxies or the validity of theoretical determinants in general.
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It can be assumed that plausible reasons (i.e. determinants) for operating lease financing for
airlines are related to business and economic reasons. For airlines, operating leases may provide
the greatly needed flexibility and mitigation of assets risk; assets such as aircrafts involve
massive costs which, if by design or management decision (financing) end up being fixed, will
increase the fragility of an airline to outside volatility substantially and thus weaken it. On that
note, with fragility in mind, it can also be speculated that CEOs are more interested in securing
their compensation by keeping the airlines they run alive in times of turmoil than focusing on
accounting-gimmicks (indeed, this note is made at a time when a global pandemic is shaking
the airline business).
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8. Conclusions
8.1 Research summary
By studying data on U.S. airlines between years 2008 – 2018, this thesis examined whether two
proxies of CEO bonuses have explanatory power over operating lease intensities. Two
empirical models used in analysis incorporated five explanatory variables based on academic
literature outlining determinants of leases. It was hypothesized that operating lease intensity is
partly driven by CEOs opportunistically aiming to maximize their compensation by avoiding
operating lease capitalization to artificially improve performance measures used in bonus
contracts.
Based on the empirical model’s results, the hypothesis was rejected. The variables measuring
bonuses were assumed to have statistically significant positive relationships with operating
lease intensity, but as it turned out, within the sample, the opposite appears to be true; both
variables are associated negatively with the dependent variable. Based on academic literature
on both leasing and management compensation, no compelling reasons were identified for the
existence of such a relationship. The result seems to be broadly in line with prior literature in
the sense that research documenting similar relationships between management compensation
and leases have so far yielded mixed results and management compensation variables have been
described to have performed poorly in general.
8.2 Limitations and suggestions for further research
Limitations to this study include at least 1) an absence of sensitivity analysis with respect to
discount rates used and assumptions related to variable construction, 2) testing whether certain
favorable and non-favorable conditions related to effects of lease capitalization (e.g. conditions
for positive net income effects of non-capitalization mentioned in the discussion of lease-
capitalization-effect ambiguities), are systematically prevalent in subsamples of companies
paying out varying levels of bonuses (i.e. controlling for these ambiguities), and 3) a limited
sample (single industry, fairly few observation of paid-out cash bonuses).
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In light of these results, it would be interesting to see a study, perhaps one which combines
several industries thus yielding a larger sample size bringing out industry-specific
characteristics hidden by lack of such comparison in this sample. The sample could be divided
into two groups based on the estimated maturities of sample companies lease portfolios, one
consisting of companies with short average time to lease maturity, and one a with similarly high
average time. As temporal effects of lease capitalization cause lower comparative earnings for
non-capitalizers of leases after the midpoint of portfolio lease life (whereas the opposite is true
for finance leases), one could examine whether a CEO bonus-variable yields a positive
relationship with operating lease intensity in the divided sample of companies with high lease-
portfolio maturities (implying growing lease portfolios). On this note, it is likely crucial to study
industries with growing lease portfolios for literature does not support the existence of a
positive relationship between management compensation levels and operating lease intensities
outside of them.
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